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  11. Introduction 
 
Growth depends upon the interaction of opportunities and choices. A country, or an entire 
region, may fail to grow either because there are no opportunities, or because choices are 
made that preclude opportunities being taken. The stark phenomenon we are trying to 
understand is that for forty years Africa stagnated while other developing regions grew. 
This chapter attempts to explain this alarming phenomenon in terms of the distinctive 
opportunities open to the region and the distinctive choices which were made.  
Before explanation comes description. The comparison of regional growth rates 
must surely seem a straightforward matter. In fact, especially for Africa, it is sensitive to 
apparently arcane choices. To date, in our view scholars have invariably got these choices 
wrong and so we must begin with a brief discussion of these issues. 
The basic unit for reporting GDP and its growth is the nation: regional figures on 
GDP are built up from these observations at the level of the nation. The most widely cited 
regional growth rates come from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the IMF and the   
Global Economic Prospects (GEP) of the World Bank. In both cases, the regional figures 
are half-way houses on the road to estimates of the growth of global GDP. Necessarily, in 
such an approach, the growth rates of regional and global GDP are simply arrived at from 
the total level of GDP and its comparison with the previous year. This is equivalent to 
averaging the annual growth rates of each country weighted by the GDP of each country. 
Around half of the GDP of sub-Saharan Africa is generated by South Africa, so that this 
approach gives a huge weight to the growth performance of South Africa. While the 
approach is appropriate if the question concerns total African GDP, it can be highly 
misleading as a description of the growth experienced by the typical African. 
The alternative common approach to reporting Africa’s growth rate is the easy 
procedure of taking the simple average of the underlying national growth rates. However, 
just as Africa’s 48 countries differ by GDP, with South Africa being the whale, so they 
differ by population, with Nigeria being the whale. The simple average is driven by a 
group of minnows that between them have both negligible population and negligible 
GDP. For some purposes the experience of each country is indeed equally important – 
each country constitutes a ‘natural experiment’ in how opportunities and choices combine 
to determine growth, and so generates equivalently valuable information for analysis. But 
as a description of the region’s experience, a simple average of country growth rates is 
clearly indefensible. 
Our own approach is to weight the underlying national growth rates by the share 
of each country’s population. While this will give us the wrong answer to the question of 
how Africa’s GDP grew in aggregate, it will give a more accurate picture of the growth 
experienced by the typical African. For example, it assigns Nigeria its true importance as 
the home of one-in-five Africans. If the growth process fails in Nigeria that is indeed 
more important for Africans than if it fails in South Africa – though it is less important 
for global GDP. For the WEO and the GEP it is global GDP that is important; for our 
purposes it is the experience of Africans. We then compare per capita growth rates, 
decade-by-decade, for two groups: 43 African countries and 56 non-African developing 
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The results are shown for the forty years 1960-1999 in Figure 1, and by decade in 
Table 1. Over the entire period the average annual growth rate for Africa was a mere 0.13 
percentage points. Taking into account the likely range of measurement inaccuracies, 
such a negligible growth rate is effectively zero. In other words, over the forty year 
period considered in this book the region stagnated. This absence of growth was 
distinctive to the region. For the rest of the developing world the per capita growth rate 
was higher than at any previous period in history at 3.63 percentage points.  
 
 
Table 1. Population-weighted growth by decade. 
Decade 43  SSA 56 Other 
Developing  Difference 
1960s  1.04 2.29 1.25 
1970s  0.86 3.23 2.37 
1980s  -0.79 4.32 5.11 
1990-2000  -0.46 4.46 4.92 
Total  0.13 3.63 3.50 
The sample consists of all developing countries with full availability. See note to Table 2. 
 
 
Thus, stagnation was divergence. Yet more seriously, the degree of divergence 
was accelerating. Whereas in the 1960s the difference in growth rates was only around 
one percentage point, since 1980 it has been around five percentage points. This 
  2widening difference was due both to growth acceleration in the rest of the developing 
world and to growth deceleration – to the extent of being negative – in Africa.  
We now turn from description to analysis: why did Africa stagnate? In Section 2 
we develop a simple classification of opportunities. We use this to build an estimate of 
the extent to which the differences between Africa’s opportunities and those of other 
regions account for the observed difference in growth outcomes. In Section 3 we turn to 
policy choices. Building up from our 26 country case studies, we develop a typology of 
policy error: episodes when some major choice was clearly mistaken. We use this 
classification for all 48 African countries. In Section 4 we bring the two analyses together 
in an attempt to explain the divergence in growth rates as being due to the interaction of 
choices and opportunities. 
 
2. Africa’s Opportunities 
 
Opportunities for economic growth differ between countries. In this section we first 
develop a simple classification of opportunities. We then apply it to developing countries 
globally, bringing out the differences between Africa and the other developing regions. 
 
A basic classification of opportunities 
 
Two features of an economy that the literature suggests might influence its potential for 




All developing countries share, to a degree, the characteristic of labor-abundance relative 
to developed countries, but they differ massively as to ‘land’-abundance. Africa is a land-
abundant region in the literal sense that it has a large land area per inhabitant compared 
with all other developing regions. However, there are obviously enormous differences in 
the value of land depending upon characteristics such as rainfall and the natural resources 
that potentially can be discovered. In measuring the endowment of ‘land’ we therefore 
have a choice as to whether to use simply the area of land per inhabitant, or to introduce 
an economic concept based on the value of the resources contained in that land. The 
former approach has recently been adopted by Adrian Wood (2003), who argues that 
Africa is basically similar to Latin America, both being land-abundant in contrast to Asia. 
However, introducing a measure of economic value to this land has considerable 
advantages – without it, the average inhabitant of Niger, with a large acreage of 
landlocked, resource-free desert, will be characterized as much better endowed than the 
average inhabitant of Equatorial Guinea, living on a small island surrounded by oil. This 
is the approach taken here – we define ‘land’-abundance in terms of the value of the 
‘rents’ contained in the exports of primary commodities as a share of GDP. The rents 
reflect the excess of world prices over production costs, commodity-by-commodity. This 
approach has the disadvantage, as compared with land area, of being endogenous to the 
choices that a society makes. For example, in Chad the absolute value of the rents were 
endogenous because the investment needed for oil exporting was delayed due to internal 
conflict. More obviously, the share of rents in GDP depends upon the choices that 
  3influence the growth of non-‘land’ GDP. The precise share of natural resource rents in 
GDP is thus clearly endogenous. To reduce this problem we classify according to a 
threshold: if an economy generates more than 10% of GDP from primary commodity 
rents it is deemed to be a ‘natural resource’ economy. Because prices of commodities 
fluctuate, potentially some economies flip backwards and forwards across this threshold 
year-to-year. Since our basic analysis is going to rest on political economy, with 
processes that do not switch on and off with such high frequency, we impose a somewhat 





Especially in the period since 1960 international trade has become increasingly important 
to the global economy. A potential impediment to participating in this trade is for a 
country to be landlocked. Sachs and his colleagues have pioneered research into this 
phenomenon which they have shown to be globally significant. Being landlocked is itself 
a very crude measure of the problem. For example, Switzerland is landlocked but this 
does not constitute an impediment, since its neighboring coastal countries – Germany, 
Italy and France – are not so much in the way of reaching its market, but themselves 
constitute its market. Hence, it might be more appropriate to nuance physical geography 
with an economic concept of distance to market. Initially, however, we take a simple 
geographic definition. Sachs has argued that even countries with a coastline can be 
effectively landlocked if their populations live a long way inland, for example, due to 
disease vectors. However, the great difference between a landlocked country and a 
coastal country whose population lives inland is that the latter has the potential for 
migration without legal impediment. Sachs has also emphasized the importance of other 
aspects of location, notably the incidence of disease, and Masters and McMillan (2001) 
have extended the concern to diseases of crops, showing the effect of the incidence of 
frost. Such refinements might indeed turn out to be critical. However, for the present we 
investigate how far a very simple classification can take us. 
 
                                                 
2 Construction of the resource-rich variable: We classify a country as resource-rich starting in the first year 
the country satisfies the following three conditions.  
•  current rents from energy, minerals and forests exceed 5% of GNI.  
•  a forward moving average of these rents exceeds 10% of GNI.  
•  the share of primary commodities in exports exceeds 20% for at least a 5-year period following 
this initial year.  
These criteria are meant to identify countries in which natural resource wealth is large enough to play a 
central role in economic management and in the interface of the country with global markets. Judgmental 
adjustments are required to “back-cast” this classification to the first part of the sample, because the 
resource rent data are available only since 1970. We therefore back-dated the initial year to 1960 if the 
three criteria held in 1970 and the share of primary commodities in exports was already above 20% in 
1965. If the three criteria held in 1970 and the share of primary commodities was above 20% in 1970 but 
below 20% in 1965, we linearly interpolated the primary commodity share between 1965 and 1970 and 
back-dated the initial ‘resource-rich’ year to the first year the interpolated share exceeded 20%. Additional 
judgmental adjustments were made for Equatorial Guinea (1996), Sierra Leone (1960) and Algeria (1960) 
based on country information. 
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The disaggregation according to endowment and location potentially generates four 
mutually exhaustive categories: landlocked resource-rich; landlocked resource-scarce; 
coastal resource-rich; coastal resource-scarce. However, there are both theoretical and 
empirical grounds for conflating the two resource-rich categories. From the perspective 
of theory, the rents on most natural resources are sufficiently high for the additional 
transport costs incurred by being landlocked are not a binding constraint upon their 
exportation. Whereas the Dutch disease effect of natural resource exports would tend to 
preclude diversification into manufactured exports even if the country was coastal. 
Hence, whether coastal or landlocked, a resource-rich country might be expected to have 
rather similar opportunities. This is borne out by the growth regression reported in Table 
2. Here, all developing countries are classified into the mutually exclusive groups of 
coastal or landlocked, with the landlocked category as the default. All countries are then 
further divided into the mutually exclusive categories or resource-rich or resource-scarce.  
 
 
Table 2. Geography and Growth: Disaggregating into Four Groups 
Dependent variable: growth in real GDP per capita. 
Variable  Estimated coefficient 
and standard error 
GCoastal            1.542*** 
            0.275 
GCoastal*RR           -0.592* 
            0.329 
GLandlocked*RR            1.397** 




* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. 
Notes: Estimation is by OLS for the full-availability developing-country sample (99 developing countries 
with at least 39 of 40 annual observations available). A full set of year effects is included. The labels 
“GCoastal” and “GLandlocked” refer to geographically-based, time-invariant coastal or landlocked status 
(with the exception of Ethiopia which changes in 1994, and Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, 
which we classify judgmentally as landlocked based on access to the coast). Here RR=resource-rich is a 
cross-cutting category defined as indicated in footnote 2.  
 
 
Globally, being coastal augments growth relative to being landlocked by over 1.5 
percentage points. However, the interactions with resource abundance are profoundly 
different for coastal and landlocked economies. Resource abundance significantly 
reduces growth in coastal economies, whereas it significantly increases growth in 
landlocked economies. Hence, as theory predicts, resource abundance wipes out the 
growth opportunity otherwise inherent in a coastal location, replacing it with a lesser 
opportunity which is equally available whether the country is coastal or landlocked. In 
our subsequent analysis we therefore collapse the disaggregation into three groups: 
  5resource-rich (whether coastal or landlocked); coastal resource-scarce; and landlocked 
resource-scarce.  
We first investigate whether the distinctions between resource-rich, non-resource-
rich coastal, and non-resource-rich landlocked, are significant in a regression of growth 
over the relevant period 1960-2000, for developing countries as a whole (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. Geography and Growth: Resource-Rich, Resource-Scarce Coastal, 
Resource-Scarce Landlocked 
Dependent variable: growth in real GDP per capita. 
 
* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Estimation is by OLS for the full-availability developing-country  
Estimated coefficients and standard 
errors  Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coastal 1.542***  0.673**  1.191*** 
  0.275 0.298 0.409 
Resource-Rich 1.003***  0.319  0.715 
  0.378 0.402 0.492 
Coastal*SSA  -- -- -1.778*** 
    0.253 
Landlocked*SSA  -- -- -1.082** 
    0.481 
Resource-Rich*SSA  -- -- -1.458** 
    0.586 
SSA --  -1.630***  -- 
   0.230   
N  3959 3959 3959 
Adjusted R
2 0.028 0.041 0.040 
RMSE  6.404 6.361 6.362 
F  4.772 5.253 5.413 
Prob>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 
sample (see note to Table 2). All regressions include a full set of year effects. 
 
 
Regression 1 finds that the distinctions are indeed significant. The resource-scarce 
coastal countries tended to growth markedly more rapidly than the resource-rich 
countries, which in turn grew much more rapidly than the landlocked resource-scarce 
countries. Since our focus will be on Africa, we next investigate whether controlling for 
these global differences, African countries had significantly distinctive growth. We first 
introduce a dummy variable for Africa: it is significantly negative (column 2). We then 
interact the dummy with each of the three geographic categories (column 3). All the 
interaction terms are significant and negative: within each category African countries 
underperformed the global average. However, beyond this there is a clear pattern. The 
underperformance was most severe for Africa’s coastal resource-scarce economies, and 
least severe for Africa’s landlocked resource-scarce economies.  
 
  6The contrasting distributions of the populations of Africa and other developing 
regions is shown in Table 4.
3 The classification of countries changes from time to time, 
according to the value of the rents from primary commodity exports. Both Africa and 
other developing regions have had resource discoveries that have increased the 
proportion of the population living in resource-rich countries, but this has been much 
more pronounced for Africa.  
 
 
Table 4. Population distribution by opportunity category. 
Group and decade  Coastal  Landlocked  Resource-
rich 
43 Sub-Saharan African countries 
1960s 67  29  4 
1970s  47 29 23 
1980s  42 29 29 
1990-2000  35 35 30 
     
Total  47 31 22 
56 Other developing countries 
1960s 96  1  3 
1970s  90 1 10 
1980s  88 1 11 
1990-2000  88 1 11 
     
Total 91  1  9 
The sample is all developing countries with full availability. 
 
 
By the 1990s only 35% of Africa’s population was living in coastal, resource-
poor economies as opposed to 88% in the rest of the developing world. Resource-rich 
economies accounted for 30%, as opposed to only 11% elsewhere. However, the most 
striking difference is in the proportion of the population living in landlocked, resource-
poor economies. Outside Africa this category was negligible – a mere one percent; within 
Africa it was 35%. Because of these differences in opportunities, any systematic global 
differences in growth rates between the opportunity groups will give rise to differences 
between African and non-African growth rates. 
 
Differential growth performance and its decomposition 
 
We now compare the growth performance of the African region against that of the rest of 
the developing world, using this three-way disaggregation. To introduce an initial sense 
of how performance evolved, we break the information down by decade (Table 5).  
 
 
                                                 
3 Appendix Table A1 provides the information for each country. 
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Decade Overall  Coastal  Landlocked  Resource-Rich 
  43 SSA  56 
Other  43 SSA  56 
Other  43 SSA  56 
Other  43 SSA  56 
Other 
1960s  1.04 2.29 1.36 2.25 0.16 0.74 2.08 3.85 
1970s  0.86 3.23 1.32 3.18 -0.31 1.26 1.42 3.89 
1980s  -0.79 4.32 -0.85 4.68 0.14 1.56 -1.67 1.50 
1990-2000 -0.46 4.46 0.27 4.74 -1.30 1.91 -0.42 2.47 
         
Total  0.13 3.63 0.50 3.79 -0.36 1.40 0.29 2.89 
  Difference Difference Difference Difference 
1960s  1.25 0.89 0.58 1.77 
1970s  2.37 1.86 1.57 2.47 
1980s  5.11 5.53 1.42 3.17 
1990-2000  4.91 4.47 3.21 2.89 
      
Total 3.50 3.29 1.76 2.60 
The sample includes all developing countries with full availability. Growth rates are population-weighted; 
the overall differential corresponds to Table 1. 
 
 
We start with the performance of the non-African developing countries. There 
were indeed large differences in growth rates between the three opportunity categories. 
The most successful of the three groups was the coastal, resource-poor economies. Their 
average per capita growth over the forty years was 3.78%. Such rapid growth is without 
historical precedent and is cumulatively transforming. After forty years of such growth - 
about the typical period of a working life - per capita incomes have increased by a factor 
of 4.6.
4 The resource-rich economies were less successful despite their apparently more 
favorable opportunities. Their growth rates were one percentage point lower than the 
coastal, resource-poor economies. Nevertheless, growth was sufficient to be transforming 
over a single working lifetime. After forty years of such growth incomes have risen by a 
factor of 3.2. The least successful were the landlocked, resource-poor economies. The 
lack of both the basic opportunities identified in our classification evidently mattered. 
Indeed, it mattered a lot: growth was barely half that even of the resource-rich economies. 
For these economies growth was insufficient to be truly transforming over a working 
lifetime, but there was still progress: over forty years incomes rose only 75 percent.   
In Africa, as in the rest of the world, the worst-performing group was the one with 
least opportunities – the landlocked, resource-scarce. In Africa this group were in gradual 
absolute decline. Cumulatively over the forty years, for the quarter of Africa’s people 
living with these limited opportunities per capita incomes fell by nearly 15 percent. 
Whereas in absolute terms Africa’s landlocked, resource-poor countries performed worst, 
in relative terms their performance was nevertheless much better than the other African 
                                                 
4 Throughout the paper we use log differentials in growth calculations. The cumulative changes reported 
here are therefore given by  ), 40 exp( / 40 g y y t t ⋅ = + where g is the relevant average growth rate from 
Table 5. 
  8opportunity groups. The African resource-rich group diverged from the rest of the 
opportunity group at 2.6 percentage points per year. However, much the widest gap was 
that for the coastal, resource-poor economies. In Africa the group barely grew, and the 
growth gap with other regions was 3.28 percentage points. That Africa’s coastal, 
resource-poor economies missed out on the transformation experienced elsewhere is the 
most important single factor in Africa’s overall growth shortfall. Not only was this 
divergence substantial, it was widening. In other regions the growth of the coastal, 
resource-poor regions was accelerating. By contrast, in Africa it was decelerating. As a 
result the growth gap tended to widen drastically over the decades: -0.93; -1.87; -5.51; -
4.45.  
Bringing together Tables 4 and 5, it is evident that African opportunities were 
heavily skewed towards the categories that in the rest of the world were least successful. 
The share of Africa’s population living in the slowest-growing category - landlocked, 
resource-poor - was 35 times that of the other developing regions, and it also had treble 
the share living in the other slow-growing category – resource-rich. To what extent did 
this difference in opportunities account for the slower overall growth of Africa with 
which we started? 
 
 
Table 6. Decomposition of growth differential by opportunity composition  
and opportunity-specific growth. 
Contribution of: 





     
1960s 1.25 0.42 0.83 
1970s 2.36 0.43 1.94 
1980s 5.11 1.48 3.63 
1990-2000  4.92 1.41 3.51 
     
Total  3.50 0.96 2.54 




− ⋅ + ⋅ − = −
c
Sc Oc Sc Oc Sc Oc S O g g g g g ω ω ω
O g  and   are population-weighted growth in the “56 Other” and “43 SSA” regions and  S g
jc ω  is the share of category c in population of region j. The regional population-weighted  
growth rates are from Table 1. 
 
 
In Table 6 we decompose the difference in the overall growth rate between Africa 
and the rest of the developing world into that part due to the difference in their 
opportunity structures, and the differences in the opportunity-specific growth rates. The 
first column repeats the overall growth differential shown in Table 1. The second column 
shows that part due to differences in opportunity structure. This is arrived at by 
calculating the growth rate that Africa would have had were each of its opportunity 
  9groups to have had the growth rate of that opportunity group in other developing regions. 
That is we combine non-African opportunity-specific growth rates, with the African 
structure of opportunities. The effect of differences in opportunities is far from negligible 
– overall it accounts for a slower growth rate for Africa of 0.96 percentage points. Yet 
this is only 27% of the growth gap to be explained. Evidently, the main explanation for 
Africa’s slow growth must look beyond this distinction between opportunities.  
The crux of Africa’s growth divergence is well illustrated in Figure 2 which 
shows the evolution of the three opportunity groups for Africa and other developing 
regions. We calculate these growth paths by setting real incomes equal to the relevant 
opportunity-specific regional averages in 1960, and then applying opportunity-specific 
regional growth rates for subsequent years. Outside of Africa, the rapid growth of the 
coastal resource-scarce economies, especially post-1980, took them by the end of our 
period comfortably into the middle-income range. Similarly, the resource-rich economies 
were able to grow out of poverty. The relatively few landlocked resource-poor economies 
still posed a development challenge, although even here if the trend continued by 2020 
they would have reached the lower-middle-income level. In Africa, all three categories 
stay resolutely in the low-income category. On these trends, quite soon the low-income 
















































































































Source: PWT6.1, World Bank, and authors' calculations.
(countries with full set of observations)
Figure 2: Simulated Real GDP per Capita
 
Note: The simulated paths show how GDP per capita would have evolved in each region and opportunity 
group if initial real incomes per capita had subsequently grown at observed region- and group-specific 
population-weighted annual growth rates. Note that the country composition of the group averages changes 
as the group composition evolves.  
 
 
  10Key questions 
 
Africa’s growth underperformance, on the above analysis, is proximately explained first 
and foremost by the failure of its coastal resource-scarce economies to replicate the 
growth pattern of other such economies as of around 1980. Additionally, it is relatively 
dependent upon natural resource economies which globally underperformed, and which 
in Africa performed markedly worse than the global average, though the pattern is very 
uneven both over time and between countries. Finally, Africa is the region with the 
largest share of landlocked resource-scarce economies which themselves somewhat 
underperformed relative to the already dismal global pattern. 
These three proximate explanations generate three further questions. Why, as of 
around 1980 did coastal Africa not participate in the global pattern? Why did most of 
Africa’s resource-rich economies fall short of the global average, and fall so far short of 
the successful pattern established by Botswana? Under what counterfactual would 
performance for Africa’s landlocked resource-scarce economies have been significantly 
better? 




Africa is diverse. Although for the region taken as a whole over the forty year period that 
we consider there was stagnation, stagnation is not the norm. The average conceals 
enormous variation between countries, and also enormous variation over time. In this 
study our focus or units of observation are country-episodes, periods within a country that 
can broadly be considered as a unity for the purpose of understanding the growth 
experience. Since the overall growth experience is so dismal, our main concern is to 
understand episodes during which the growth process failed. However, our 
characterization of episodes is not defined by the growth outcomes, but rather by various 
dysfunctional political-economy configurations which we refer to as syndromes. The core 
of our study is to understand the overall growth failure in terms of four distinct 
syndromes, each of which accounts for growth failures in particular countries at 
particular times. The syndromes are not exhaustive of African experience. We do not 
attempt to force experience into the syndromes. Rather, in reviewing the accounts 
provided by our 26 case studies it became apparent that although no single overarching 
account of Africa’s growth failure could be sustained, neither was each country’s 
experience entirely unique. Our identification of four groups of syndromes came out of 
this review of our case study histories: some patterns became evident.  
Having identified the syndromes to which African countries appear to have been 
prone, we then carefully reviewed each country’s forty-year history with the country 
authors, to establish whether and when its experience is well-described by one or other of 
these syndromes. Some countries never experience any of the syndromes; others are 
characterized by more than one syndrome at the same time. Where a country episode was 
characterized by multiple syndromes it became a matter of judgment whether one of them 
was of overriding importance, or whether to understand the growth outcome multiple 
syndromes needed to be taken into account. Hence, some episodes feature in two or more 
chapters in our syndrome-specific analysis of Part II. In a final step, we reviewed the 
  11economic histories of 22 additional African countries in order to extend the syndrome 
classification to all of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The syndromes are not intended to be exhaustive of the ways in which growth can 
fail. Rather, they represent salient episodes of purposive failure attributable to human 
agency within the society, whether by leaders, governments or groups outside 
government such as rebel movements. A country may avoid these syndromes yet fail to 
grow, for example because it is unlucky in being hit by shocks, or because it is very badly 
endowed. We will of course be considering such explanations of the growth failure, and 
indeed sometimes they are central to understanding growth outcomes, but they are not 
included in our syndromes. Similarly, because our syndromes are defined by the choices 
of key actors rather than by growth outcomes, in principle a country episode might be 
characterized by one of our syndromes and yet experience sustainable growth. However, 
where this happens, unless there is some manifest lucky event, our characterization of the 
behavior pattern as a syndrome must be called into question. A behavior pattern within 
which several countries achieved sustainable growth could not reasonably be regarded as 
a syndrome. 
We now discuss the syndromes. They fall into four major groupings of behavior: 
regulatory, distributive, inter-temporal, and state breakdown, and we consider them in 




Most African countries became independent at a time when socialist and communist 
strategies of economic development were fashionable. In Chapter 3 we discuss in detail 
the nature of such influences on African policy choices – in effect, why some of the 
syndromes were particularly common in Africa. Here we simply recognize that as a 
matter of fact many African countries adopted socialist or communist strategies of 
development. Our concern here is purely with the consequences of these choices for 
growth. The core of socialist and communist economic strategies was the regulation of 
economic activity, the ownership of productive enterprises by the state, and an 
industrialization strategy modeled, at least loosely, on that of the USSR and pursued 
behind high trade barriers financed through the taxation of exports. Additionally, at the 
level of political institutions, socialism and communism at least in Africa were used to 
justify one-party states. While this was common to both socialist and communist 
strategies, there were substantial differences in the extent to which regulation and state 
ownership were applied. While there is a continuum of the intensity of these economic 
regimes the differences along the continuum are sufficiently pronounced for it to be 
useful to distinguish between what we term ‘hard controls’ – in effect something close to 
the full communist vision, - and ‘soft controls’, where some parts of the economic would 
be regulated and some nationalized, but in which the ambition or efficacy of the policies 
was much more moderate. For example, in a ‘hard control’ regime such as Congo 
Brazaville, or Tanzania 1973-85, the banks and other ‘commanding heights’ of the 
economy would be nationalized, and virtually all private economic activity subject to 
regulations which substantially changed behavior through price controls and investment 
licensing. In a ‘soft control’ regime such as Zambia 1963-91, substantial parts of the 
economy – such as the banks - remained private, and price controls, although significant, 
  12were less pervasive.  Just as there an element of judgment as to where along a continuum 
it is best to distinguish between hard and soft control regimes, so it is a matter of 
judgment where soft control regimes stop and other types of economic strategies start. In 
the 1960s planning was so fashionable that virtually all states had five-year plans. 
Similarly, virtually all states controlled some prices, or at least passed legislation which 
notionally set controlled prices. For example, Kenya had some price and interest rate 
controls, and regulated some aspects of internal agricultural trade, and Malawi had major 
state and quasi-state enterprises. By the standards of the 1990s these policy stances look 
quite interventionist. Yet we judge them to be markedly less interventionist than the 
strategies pursued in states such as Zambia and so do not include them in our category of 
‘soft controls’. Even the softest of the ‘soft control’ states involves regulation and state 
ownership outside the range found in the European social-market economies. To 
summarize, we have two types of regulatory syndrome – soft and hard control regimes. 
Each of these was quite common in Africa. If we take as our measure of exposure to 
syndromes the number of years in which any country in our sample experienced them, we 
find that between them the two variants of the regulatory syndrome accounted for around 
35% of African economic history during 1960-2000. The soft control regime was about 




We now turn to the second type of syndrome which concerns policies towards the 
redistribution of income between ethno-regional groups. Around 44% of African 
economic history during our period is characterized by this syndrome. All governments 
intervene in order to redistribute income between households, most commonly from 
richer to poorer. This is not our concern. Rather, we regard as potentially damaging for 
growth those situations in which the basic units of redistribution are ethno-regional. 
However, not all such redistributions are dysfunctional. Growth can potentially be 
damaged both by errors of commission and errors of omission.  
We begin with errors of commission: the power of the state is used to redistribute 
substantial amounts of income from one ethno-regional group to another, and this has 
side-effects which reduce growth. For example, public revenues might be used to benefit 
a particular group rather than to provide public goods. This can adversely affect growth 
because some of the public goods that are neglected are capital goods. Another channel 
by which growth is adversely affected is if high costs are inflicted upon the economy in 
order to raise the revenues that are needed to finance redistribution. A third channel is if 
large-scale redistribution between ethnic groups so inflates the returns to power that 
substantial resources are devoted to the struggle to gain power – the concept known as 
‘rent-seeking’.  
Conversely, errors of omission occur if the state fails to redistribute between 
ethno-regional groups in a situation in which such redistribution would be growth-
enhancing. One such situation is if one ethnic group is so much poorer than the other that 
the ordering is almost lexicographic: virtually all members of one ethnic group are poorer 
than those in the other. In such a situation there are reasonable grounds for expecting 
redistribution between ethnic groups to raise growth, for example because households in 
the poorer group are credit constrained. Another situation in which inter-ethnic 
  13redistribution can raise growth is if it pre-empts a strategy of violence on the part of the 
poorer ethnic group. In the absence of a voluntary transfer, the rational strategy for a 
poor-but-strong group may be to use violence to enforce a transfer. Pre-emptive 
redistribution can then be cost-effective even for the victim group because it avoids the 
costs of violence.  
The first type of ethno-regional redistribution has been common in Africa during 
our period. An example of such an episode would be Kenya under President Moi. During 
this long episode an alliance of minor, and relatively poor, regions held power and used it 
to redistribute from the rich and previously favored region of Central Province and 
Nairobi. An example of how growth was sacrificed was the telecommunications strategy. 
The post office was used to create employment for the Kalenjin, the ethnic group at the 
core of President Moi’s constituency, and to ensure the profitability of the post office it 
was cross-subsidized from telecommunications in a merged enterprise. In turn, to 
maintain the public telecommunications business profitable, competition in 
telecommunications was circumscribed, resulting in a service that was both bad and high 
cost. Since globally good telecommunications was becoming regarded as an essential 
feature of an environment conducive for growth, this ethnic transfer program thus 
inflicted high costs on the economy.  
At the extreme end of ethno-regional redistribution, we find ‘looting’. By this we 
mean a situation in assets, whether private or public, are stripped outside the context of 
the rule of law and due process. Often this is done by a leader and his small entourage 
who run the government for their personal financial advantage. In such a polity power 
will necessarily become highly concentrated because the leader cannot expect his 
objective to be widely shared. The power amassed by the head of state then becomes used 
to generate opportunities for personal wealth. Even were the dictator confident that his 
family would remain in power in perpetuity, such a concentration of power would be 
likely to affect growth adversely. However, personal rule is unlikely to be sustainable 
beyond one generation and since the dictator and his family are likely to recognize this, 
the inter-temporal aspects of the looting syndrome are similar to those of elite end-games 
to be discussed below. Long term growth of the economy is of little value to the dictator 
because he does not expect to benefit from such growth. Indeed, to the extent that growth 
would strengthen the position of actors other than the dictator and his entourage, it might 
weaken his hold on power. Further, because power is concentrated and the objective for 
which that power is used is so malign, other private actors can have little confidence that 
their legitimate interests will be respected. Few African leaders have been entirely 
altruistic or indeed entirely honest, and there is a continuum of personal corruption which 
at some point shades into the looting syndrome. However, we have reserved this 
classification for cases in which the personal aggrandizing behavior of the head of state 
was sufficiently dramatic to become a major explanation of macroeconomic performance. 
For example, we regard both Idi Amin in Uganda and General Abacha in Nigeria as not 
just clear cases of centralized personal power used for corrupt purposes, but that the 
economic history of these countries during their periods of rule cannot be understood 
without reference to this behavior.  
Looting is not synonymous with dictatorship. Most dictators are not looters, and 
some democracies not only permit but actually induce looting. In Africa the most serious 
single episode of looting was indeed under the auspices of democracy, namely the 
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and this period was the peak of the oil boom, potentially providing the country with 
massive finance for productive investment. This opportunity, probably the most 
important in Africa for our entire forty year period, was missed due to looting during 
democracy. 
Whereas most of Africa’s redistribution syndromes have been errors of 
commission, there have been some cases of errors of omission. The clearest case of a 
failure to redistribute between ethnic groups being directly dysfunctional for growth was 
South Africa under apartheid. A reasonable case can be made that redistribution would 
have enhanced the productivity of the poor ethnic group by more than it would have 
reduced the productivity of the richer group. Judgments as to failures to make pre-
emptive redistributions are more difficult. An example is Chad prior to 1990. In Chad 
northerners tend to have a comparative advantage in military power and southerners in 
productive economic activity. Hence, unless the south redistributes to the north on a 
voluntary basis the north is liable to attempt to enforce redistribution through violent 
conflict. Post-1990 Chad established a sometimes fragile peace, partly due to such 
redistribution. Prior to 1990 the failure to adopt voluntary redistribution may have 




We now turn to the third type of syndrome in which the key errors were inter-temporal. 
Obviously, since our story concerns growth, or rather the failure of growth, in one sense 
all the syndromes involved inter-temporal errors. However, a useful distinction can be 
drawn between errors which had often inadvertent adverse consequences for growth – as 
in the control regimes – and errors which directly involved an undervaluation of the 
future. We estimate that inter-temporal syndromes account for around 18% of African 
economic history. We distinguish between two types of inter-temporal syndrome : 
anticipated redistributions, and unsustainable growth.   
Anticipated redistribution occurs when an elite group anticipates a loss of power. 
For some reason it comes to believe that it will be unable to defend its level of income 
and, more particularly, its ownership of assets. The group therefore sees itself as in an 
‘end-game’ in which its critical objectives are to amass wealth as rapidly as possible and 
to shift existing wealth abroad. The group may come to believe that its period in power is 
limited for various reasons, but the most likely is that it is if the elite are an ethnic 
minority faced by mounting popular pressure for political reform. Typically, the minority 
will have been in a position of entrenched power. For the period when it was confident of 
power it may have run a redistributive syndrome, or it may have managed the economy 
for the objective of economic growth – with income concentrated in the hands of the 
elite, growth delivers the elite disproportionate benefits. However, once the elite begins 
to doubt its ability to sustain itself in power the objective of growth become less 
attractive. The clearest example in Africa of such a switch in elite expectations occurs 
outside our sample – in Angola following the Portuguese revolution of 1974. Suddenly, 
the Angolan elite was confronted with a radically changed political situation in which in 
was evident that Portugal would not sustain the elite in power. This produced a dramatic 
economic exodus in which assets were shipped out of the country. Within our sample 
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probably South Africa after around 1980. During the late 1970s political events in 
Southern Africa transformed prospects for continued Afrikaaner rule in South Africa. By 
the early 1980s the South African economy – largely controlled by white interests – had 
switched from a configuration of high investment and rapid growth to one of low 
investment and stagnation. We attribute this at least in part to an emerging fear on the 
part of the white elite that the returns on further investment would be subject to high 
taxation or other forms of redistribution. This state of affairs continued until the handover 
of power, and to an extent has continued even under ANC rule.  A similar 
characterization applies, we think, to Burundi, where the Tutsi elite came to doubt its 
ability to hand onto power given that it formed such a small minority of the population. 
In the event, the elite did manage to hang onto power for a long time, but in heavily 
contested circumstances, so that the retention of elite power continued to look precarious.  
The other inter-temporal syndrome we term ‘unsustainable growth’. The concept 
of ‘sustainable growth’ is normally used in the context of environmental degradation – 
for example, growth achieved by destroying forests. Although destroying forests is an 
unsustainable activity, it does not necessarily imply unsustainable growth. If the profits 
from deforestation are well-invested, the economy can simply move to some other 
activity at a sustainably higher level of income. Unsustainable growth occurs when a 
country fails to transform temporary income into permanent income, so that a period of 
good times is followed be a period of reversion. While such unsustainable growth is a 
missed opportunity, a pernicious variant is where the good times sow the seeds of 
subsequent destruction: the future is worse than if the temporary boom had never 
occurred. Environmental destruction indeed sometimes takes this form. However, there 
are two other routes to impoverishment that are particularly pertinent for our subsequent 
analysis: debt accumulation and irreversible expenditures. In the former the country 
amplifies temporarily favorable circumstances by borrowing internationally, but does not 
transform the borrowed resources into productive assets. In the latter, the country uses 
temporary income to lock into a pattern of expenditures which cannot easily be reversed, 
so that as income reverts to its former level damage is incurred by reducing expenditures 
which are more valuable than those which into which the country has become locked.  
Africa has a high natural resource endowment per capita. Natural resources most 
obviously tempt a country into environmental unsustainability: depletion of the resource 
without adequate replacement with other assets. The depletion of Zambian copper is an 
example: the issue is not that the copper should have been left in the ground, - the 
resource depletion itself was clearly appropriate, – but that other assets should have been 
accumulated. However, natural resources also lure a country into unsustainability by 
other routes. The price shocks common to natural resources may induce periods of high 
income in which debt is accumulated and irreversible expenditure commitments are 
made. Nigeria during the oil boom of 1974-86 is the classic example of a temporary 
boom being geared up by debt accumulation. The oil boom was approximately doubled 
by debt accumulation. By the mid-1980s the country hit its borrowing constraint, 
coincident with a collapse in the oil price, so that real expenditure roughly halved over a 
very short period. Cote d’Ivoire during the 1970s was another example of unsustainable 
growth, in which public expenditure rose at an astonishingly fast pace, creating 
commitments, notably a government payroll, that could not be reduced during the 
  16following decade. A variant of unsustainable growth occurs where an unsustainable 
strategy is chosen in the context of a control regime. For example, in Congo Brazaville 
the oil boom was used to expand manufacturing industry behind heavy import protection. 
Statistically, this produced a phase of rapid growth, followed by a post-boom phase of 
equally rapid collapse, so that the economy appeared to have grown and then contracted. 
However, because the control regime heavily distorted domestic prices from opportunity 
costs, some of this growth was illusory. In effect, an unproductive activity was induced 
which was misleadingly recorded in the national accounts as productive. Hence, the 
growth might have been illusory rather than merely unsustainable.  
The various forms of unsustainable growth are particularly pernicious because of 
their potential for confusion. Growth – often rapid growth - is coincident with the policy 
error, followed some years later by rapid decline. It is easy to mis-diagnose the decline as 
being due to errors made during the decline, and to see the growth phase as a success. A 
classic instance of such mis-diagnosis is the popular critique of the ‘structural adjustment 
program’ in Nigeria in the late 1980s. Because living standards were in radical decline 
during this period, the policies adopted during the period were blamed, despite the 
astonishing achievement that the growth of output was actually faster during this period 




The final syndrome is where the state is unable to maintain internal security. Again there 
is a continuum here from an inability to control crime, through to large-scale sustained 
rebellion. During our period Africa was increasingly affected by violent rebellion, 
although in our sample it accounts for only around 14% of African experience. 
Nevertheless, the impact upon growth has been considerable. During civil war economies 
go into steep decline. For example, by the end of its period of conflict per capita incomes 
in Sierra Leone had fallen to only one third of their pre-conflict level. Further, many of 
these costs prove persistent – military spending remains high in post-conflict periods, and 
the social disruption, notably worsened health states, can last for a generation. Finally, 
many of the costs of a civil war spill over to neighbors. This can occur due to rivalries in 
military spending, to demand spillovers, migration and the disruption of transport routes. 
For example, the civil war in Mozambique approximately doubled the costs of 
international transport for Malawi, and the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo prevented the Central African Republic from using its normal river route to the 
sea.  
 
Syndromes and Opportunities 
 
The population-weighted distribution of syndromes across the opportunities is shown in 
Table 7. Each person-year is an observation. For the coastal countries the most common 
syndrome was regulatory. Unsurprisingly, for the resource-rich the most common were 
redistributive and inter-temporal: there was a lot for the state to redistribute, and both the 
volatility of income and the scope for borrowing provided scope for inter-temporal error. 
Perhaps as a result of these greater opportunities, the resource-rich countries were overall 
  17much more prone to the syndromes. The landlocked were differentially prone to state 
breakdown, and differentially free of the inter-temporal syndrome.   
 
 
Table 7. Frequency of syndromes by opportunity category.  
  Coastal Landlocked Resource-
Rich Total 
Distribution of people years 
Percent 44.4 30.9 24.7 100 
Frequency of Syndromes (% of country/years)
*
Regulatory  37.8 37.0 25.8 35.2 
Redistributive  28.4 46.2 79.8 44.0 
Intertemporal  15.1 4.8 46.7 18.2 
State Breakdown  9.3 25.6 8.5 14.1 
Syndrome Free  33.8 20.5 9.3 24.9 
Notes: The table uses all observations for 48 African countries, from the year of independence to 2000.  
*Column sums exceed 100% because countries can exhibit multiple syndromes. 
 
 
A more formal test of whether the opportunity groups differed in their proneness 
to each syndrome is set out in Table 8 which reports probit regressions with the 
landlocked category as the default. The landlocked resource-scarce countries are 
significantly less likely to be syndrome-free than their coastal counterparts, This is 
consistent with a longstanding hypothesis of Jeffrey Sachs that landlocked countries have 
worse policies because the returns to good policies are lower. They are also significantly 
more likely to suffer state breakdown than either of the other groups and less likely to 
suffer inter-temporal syndromes, perhaps because the societies are too poor to accumulate 
either assets or debts. As between the resource-rich and the coastal resource-scarce 
groups, the former are significantly more prone to the redistributive and intertermporal 
syndromes, and less prone to the regulatory. The greater proneness of the coastal 
resource-scarce group to the regulatory syndrome may reflect the greater relative 
importance of trade and the private sector in the economy: regulation is feasible and 
lucrative.  
 
<Table 8, next page>  
 
Table 9 summarizes how the prevalence of the syndromes in aggregate evolved 
decade-by-decade. During the 1990s the incidence of the syndromes declined sharply, but 
on average during the decade around 60% of Africans were still living in syndrome 
conditions.  
 
<Tables 9 and 10, next page> 
 
Table 10 shows the evolution by opportunity group, taking into account the 
distribution of Africa’s population. Although on average over the forty years the coastal, 
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time. During the 1980s, when in the rest of the world the coastal, resource-poor countries 
started to take off, only 4% of the resource-scarce, coastal economies, and hence less than 
2% of Africa’s population, was living in those which were syndrome-free. Between the 
1980s and the 1990s there were two dramatic changes. The coastal countries largely 
broke free of the regulatory syndrome, and the resource-rich countries largely broke free 
of the inter-temporal syndrome.  
 
 










Coastal  0.516***  0.016  -0.541***  0.591***  -0.712*** 
Resource-Rich  -0.201  -0.698***  0.804***  1.679***  -0.699*** 
       
N  1894  1894  1894  1894  1894 
Pseudo R
2 0.258  0.179  0.154  0.346  0.105 
chi
2 325.595  213.428  149.981  325.350  121.017 
Prob>chi
2 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Marginal impact of category on probability of syndrome: 
Coastal  0.141***  0.006  -0.206***  0.082***  -0.130*** 
Resource-Rich  -0.052  -0.224***  0.312***  0.406***  -0.099*** 
Significance test for equality of coastal and resource-rich coefficients: 
Prob>chi
2 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.929 
Reject  CO=RR?  Yes Yes Yes yes  No 
* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. All regressions have year effects. The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
for the occurrence of the syndrome. Landlocked is the omitted category. 
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category.  
Share of 48-country SSA population exhibiting at least one 
syndrome 
Location of population 
Decade 
Overall 
Coastal Landlocked  Resource-Rich 
1960s  0.52 0.28 0.23 0.01 
1970s  0.89 0.41 0.26 0.22 
1980s  0.94 0.40 0.26 0.27 
1990-2000  0.61 0.17 0.20 0.24 
Total  0.74 0.31 0.24 0.19 
The table classifies all country/years for 48 SSA countries 1960-2000. 
 
 
Table 10. Distribution of population by opportunity, syndrome and decade. 






















Coastal        
1960s  0.68  0.57 0.19 0.24 0.01 0.11 
1970s  0.49  0.13 0.59 0.25 0.23 0.07 
1980s  0.43  0.04 0.72 0.32 0.23 0.07 
1990-2000  0.36  0.56 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.07 
Total  0.49  0.33 0.42 0.25 0.13 0.08 
Llocked        
1960s  0.29  0.20 0.37 0.33 0.00 0.33 
1970s  0.29  0.08 0.57 0.59 0.09 0.11 
1980s  0.28  0.07 0.57 0.52 0.09 0.20 
1990-2000  0.35  0.40 0.13 0.35 0.04 0.32 
Total  0.30  0.19 0.41 0.45 0.05 0.24 
Resrich        
1960s  0.04  0.84 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 
1970s  0.23  0.07 0.24 0.77 0.76 0.04 
1980s  0.29  0.04 0.46 0.78 0.70 0.07 
1990-2000  0.29  0.18 0.08 0.76 0.07 0.11 
Total  0.21  0.28 0.21 0.59 0.38 0.07 
Notes: The table covers all country/year observations between 1960 and 2000 for 48 countries in SSA. 




  204. Consequences of the Syndromes for Growth 
 
Possible effects of the syndromes on opportunities 
 
Between them these syndromes occupy around three-quarters of African experience. 
Potentially, this could imply that one quarter of the countries in Africa completely 
avoided the syndromes and three quarters were permanently stuck in them. In practice, 
few countries were permanently in these syndromes but even fewer escaped them 
altogether. In our sample, only Malawi, Botswana and Mauritius escaped all the 
syndromes for a sustained substantial period – more than two decades. All other countries 
at best had relatively brief episodes free from the syndromes. While growth was often 
reasonable during these syndrome-free episodes, they were too brief to raise incomes 
substantially.  
The effect of the syndromes, or their absence, has to be evaluated against some 
counterfactual which reflects opportunities forgone. 
The natural resource economies, of which Africa has a considerable number, are 
the most dependent upon governance. Natural resources generate large rents which 
accrue to government, and so the extent to which the rents are harnessed to growth 
depends critically upon government decisions. The sensitivity of performance to 
governance is well-illustrated by the contrast between Botswana and Sierra Leone. At the 
beginning of our period the two economies had approximately equal per capita incomes, 
and both were endowed with diamonds. By the end of our period the difference in per 
capita incomes was approximately ten to one, with Botswana having sustained one of the 
fastest growth rates in the world and Sierra Leone one of the fastest rates of decline. 
Recall that Botswana is one of the very few countries which we judge to have avoided all 
of the syndromes and this appears to have made a spectacular difference. It serves as an 
interesting counterfactual to the dismal growth performance of all the other natural 
resource economies that fell victim to one or other of the syndromes. Not all the 
syndromes are likely to have been equally damaging to natural resource economies. For 
such economies the key government decisions are inter-temporal – the rents extracted 
must be turned into productive investment either by the state itself or by the private 
sector. Hence, vertical and regional redistributions may not be particularly damaging in 
this context; indeed, regional redistributions might be desirable. Similarly, because the 
state in necessarily going to be large, soft control regimes may do relatively little damage.  
The coastal economies without natural resources had the opportunity to follow the 
development path common in East Asia, by which countries integrated into the world 
economy through labor-intensive manufactured exports. Such exports are transactions-
intensive with very low margins of profitability, and so performance is sensitive to 
economic policies. Success requires reasonable economic infrastructure and relative 
prices that come reasonably close to reflecting social opportunity cost. The opportunity 
for penetrating global markets deteriorated during our period because by the 1990s China 
(in manufactures) and India (in services) were so successful that there was considerably 
less room for other entrants to the market. Unfortunately, no mainland African coastal 
economy had policies conducive to manufactured exports for a sustained period prior to 
1990. During the 1970s Cote d’Ivoire began to break into European markets for 
manufactures, but this was killed off by the end of the decade due to growing exchange 
  21rate overvaluation. The only African economy which succeeded in global manufactures 
was Mauritius – like Botswana a country we judge to have avoided all of the syndromes 
for an extended period. Mauritius is now by far the richest country in Africa in terms of 
per capita income, and so this again gives some insight into the opportunity cost of the 
syndromes in other coastal economies without natural resources. Unlike the natural 
resource economies, for manufactured exports the key decisions are not inter-temporal 
but rather concern the costs of doing business. Hence, for this group of economies we 
would expect that the control regimes – hard and soft – would be particularly damaging, 
as would a prioritization of redistribution – vertical or regional – over efficiency.   
The landlocked economies without natural resources had dramatically worse 
opportunities for growth. Being landlocked they were precluded from significant entry 
into the global market for manufactures and without high-value natural resources they 
were left dependent upon agriculture. Globally, there is no example of such a country 
experiencing rapid growth during this period. One African country in this category we 
judge to have avoided all the syndromes for the entire 40 year period, namely Malawi. 
Yet its growth performance was modest. Uganda, another landlocked economy, 
performed well in the 1990s but to a substantial extent this was a recovery from previous 
collapse. Just as there is little upside potential for such economies, they may be relatively 
resilient to policy errors and predation. Peasant farmers have the option of retreating into 
subsistence and so defending their incomes. Hence, this group of economies may have 
lost least, both in absolute terms and relative to the counterfactual of potential growth, 
from their experience of the syndromes.   
An Africa that had been free from the syndromes would thus, in our view, have 
looked very different not just in terms of overall growth, but in terms of the relative 
performance of countries. We would have expected to see the natural resource economies 
performing equivalently to Botswana, - in effect reaching lower-middle income status. 
We would have expected the coastal, resource-poor economies to have done better – 
during our period those countries that succeeded in breaking into manufactured export 
markets experienced spectacular growth. There seems no natural obstacle to countries 
such as Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar and Mozambique having 
similar growth experiences to Mauritius and Thailand. Such growth would have produced 
massive inequalities in income between African countries, with the landlocked 
economies without natural resources experiencing severe relative decline. This in turn 
would presumably have fueled substantial migration from the landlocked economies to 
the coast. This was indeed the pattern early in our period, before African growth 
decelerated. Malawi had a massive outflow of workers to South Africa, and Burkina Faso 
had a massive outflow to Cote d’Ivoire. In effect, Africa would have seen population 
movements similar to the migration to the coast that has occurred as a result of 
geographically skewed growth in China. Africa’s relatively uniform lack of growth is 
thus, in our view, not the product of a uniform phenomenon, but rather the interaction of 
distinct syndromes with differential effects in different countries according to their 
opportunities.  
 
  22How important were the syndromes? 
 
Just as we have investigated the contribution of differences in opportunities to accounting 
for the difference between African growth rates and those of other developing countries, 
so we can potentially do the same for the syndromes. In Table 11 we make an extreme 
‘working assumption’ that we subsequently investigate, namely that other developing 
regions did not suffer from the syndromes. This assumption is not realistic, but it enables 
us to calculate an extreme bound as to how important the syndromes might have been. If 
the opportunity specific growth rates differ little between syndrome and syndrome-free 
periods, then as a matter of logic the syndromes cannot account for Africa’s slow growth. 
Table 11 is constructed by taking as a counterfactual that without the syndromes each 
African opportunity group would have grown during a decade at the rate of the 
syndrome-free countries in the group in that decade. The first column takes from Table 6 
the growth difference to be explained once we have controlled for Africa’s distinctive 
opoprtunities. The second column shows the difference accounted for by the gap between 
the syndrome-free growth rate in each opportunity group in Africa, and that in other 
developing regions. The final column shows the contribution of the syndromes.  
Taking the forty years as a whole, the syndrome effect is by far the most 
important of the three explanatory factors. It accounts for around half (52%) of the 
overall growth differential. Taken together with the 27% accounted for by differences in 
opportunity structures, the residual accounted for by the difference between Africa’s 
syndrome-free growth rate and that of other regions is only 0.72 percentage points. So, 
conditional upon the extreme assumption that the syndromes were unique to Africa they 
provide a lot of explanatory power. Decade-by-decade, the story is a little more 























1960s 0.83  -0.33  1.16 
1970s 1.94  -0.12  2.06 
1980s  3.63 1.16 2.46 
1990-2000  3.51 1.63 1.88 
      
Total  2.54 0.63 1.91 
*This column is the same as column 3 of Table 6. 
Note: Supposing the syndromes are unique to SSA, African pop-weighted growth in category c is 
then where  ), ( Acn Acf Acn Acf Acn Acn Acf Acf Ac g g g g g g − − = + = ω ω ω Ack ω  is the population share 
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syndromes. Substituting for   in the earlier equation, we can decompose growth as    Ac g
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Table 11 is based on differences between Africa and other developing regions. A 
different approach is to analyze growth within Africa through regression analysis and 
estimate the effect of the syndromes. The effect of the syndromes in aggregate is shown 
in Table 12. 
 
 
Table 12. Robust regressions controlling for shocks. 
Dependent variable: growth in real GDP per capita. 
Variable  Country fixed effects not included  Country fixed effects 
included 
A. Syndrome-free status not instrumented 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Syndrome-free 2.076***  2.040*** 1.890*** 2.071*** 2.162*** 2.147*** 
  0.241 0.332 0.249 0.318 0.303 0.366 
Partner  growth  0.296***  -- 0.299***  -- 0.298***  -- 
  0.096  -- 0.094  -- 0.101  -- 
Dry  year  -0.463*  -0.174 -0.309 -0.224 -0.265 -0.252 
  0.264 0.259 0.250   0.306  0.333 0.328 
Coastal  -- -- 0.476  0.008  -- -- 
  -- -- 0.364    0.306  -- -- 
Resrich  -- -- 0.050  -0.254  -- -- 
  -- -- 0.415    0.357  -- -- 
N  1492  1770   1492   1770  1492  1770 
Pseudo R2  0.028  0.049   0.029   0.050  0.066  0.092 
B.  Syndrome-free status instrumented 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Syndrome-free 3.182***  5.100***  3.209*** 5.196*** 2.150**  3.765 
  0.882 1.231 0.877 1.076 0.882 1.355*** 
Partner  growth  0.335***  -- 0.234**  -- 0.358**  -- 
  0.106  -- 0.112  -- 0.166  -- 
Dry  year  -0.750**  -0.308 -0.784**  -0.431 -0.653 -0.283 
  0.339 0.319 0.340 0.357 0.441 0.463 
Coastal  -- -- 0.164  -0.236  -- -- 
  -- -- 0.471  0.344  -- -- 
Resrich  -- -- -0.067  -0.087  -- -- 
  -- -- 0.578  0.487  -- -- 
N  1183 1313 1183 1313 917  965 
Pseudo  R2  0.016 0.050 0.018 0.053 0.045 0.090 
Pseudo R2 from 
stage 1 probit  0.13 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.34 0.47 
  24Notes: Reported coefficients are from Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) regressions. Bootstrapped standard 
errors appear below the coefficient estimates (* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01). In panel B we obtain 
instrumental variables estimates by running a stage 1 probit equation for syndrome-free status on all 
exogenous variables and all 3 instruments (rule by fear*ethnic fractionalization, socialist government, and a 
1961-89 ‘cold war’ dummy), and then estimating an LAD regression in stage 2 with syndrome-free 
replaced by the predicted probability from stage 1. To obtain consistent standard errors in panel B, we 
bootstrap the full two-stage process, except in column 12 where there were insufficient observations to do 
so. (Thus in column 12 we report the bootstrapped standard errors from the second-stage regression. These 
were very close to the ‘fully bootstrapped’ standard errors in the cases of columns 7-11.) All regressions 
that exclude partner growth include a full set of annual dummy variables (period fixed effects). The dry 
year variable is a dummy variable equaling 1 when rainfall is more than one country-specific standard 
deviation below its country-specific long-run mean. 
 
 
The regressions control for rainfall shocks and opportunity categories. The 
syndromes in aggregate are always highly significant. Depending on which of the six 
specifications is chosen, the syndromes are found to have lowered the growth rate by 
between 1.9 and 2.2 percentage points, which is compatible with the inference of Table 
11 that the syndromes on average reduced growth by around 1.9 percentage points. 
The results of Table 12A are potentially exposed to the critique that the 
syndromes are endogenous to economic performance. This could arise both because as 
researchers we may have inadvertently tended to categorize as syndromes those periods 
in which growth was low, or because periods of economic decline make a society more 
prone to various of the syndromes. We have tried to guard against the former, but the 
latter is undoubtedly a potential problem: for example, other research has established that 
periods of economic decline make African societies more prone to civil war (Miguel et 
al. 2004). We first test for endogeneity. This is not straightforward, since the regressions 
in Table 12 are quantile regressions and so not directly amenable to endogeneity tests. To 
perform such tests we therefore take a standard least-squares approach. Using a Hausman 
test we cannot reject that syndrome-free status is exogenous. However, because we have 
some a priori reason to be concerned about endogeneity, we adopt the approach of using 
instruments for the syndromes. Our instruments are taken from Chapter 11 where we 
indeed attempt to endogenize the syndromes. There we find that the syndromes 
collectively are made much more likely by the conjunction of ethnic fractionalization 
with an extreme form of dictatorship which we term ‘rule-by-fear’. While this is more 
fully discussed in that chapter, here we note that it is the combination of these features, 
rather than their direct effects, that produce the syndromes. Ethnic fractionalization is 
evidently likely to be exogenous to the syndromes. While the political system itself might 
be endogenous, there is less reason to be concerned that the political system will only be 
endogenous in the context of ethnic fractionalization, so that the combination is a 
reasonable instrument for the syndromes. Our second instrument is the end of the Cold 
War, which is clearly exogenous to any developments in African politics. Our third 
instrument is a dummy variable for whether the head of state was avowedly ‘socialist’. 
As we discuss in Chapter 4, African heads of state tended to get their ideas from 
prevailing international intellectual fashions rather than from the experience of their own 
societies. To a considerable extent, whether leaders had ‘socialist’ ideas did not derive 
from the recent economic performance of their own societies. Table 12B reports the 
results of using these three variables as instruments for the syndromes. The results are 
  25qualitatively unchanged: the syndromes are growth-reducing. Quantitatively, the effect of 
being syndrome-free is now even larger, with the effect on the growth rate ranging 
between two and five percentage points. Each of these variables is thus a reasonable 
instrument for the syndromes, although the first and third can potentially be questioned. 
Even when each of the three variables is used in turn as the sole instrument the results 
remain significant: being syndrome-free substantially augments growth.
5   
Given that the adverse effect of the syndromes appears to be robust we next 
investigate in what contexts they were particularly damaging to the growth process. For 
this we use quantile regressions, the results of which are reported in Figure 3 together 
with the bounds showing the 95% confidence interval. Coefficients are estimated for each 
decile, the fifth decile corresponding precisely to the results reported in Table 12A. The 
quantile regression shows that the syndromes have different effects at different deciles of 
‘fortune’. For those countries with the very best fortune, avoidance of syndromes makes 
only a modest difference. For those with the worst fortune it makes an enormous 
difference. This implies that avoidance of the syndromes is a sufficient condition for 
avoiding growth collapses: if a country is syndrome-free even extreme ill-fortune is not 
ruinous for the growth process. Being syndrome-free is not a necessary condition for 
rapid growth of real GDP: if the country is sufficiently fortunate it can grow rapidly on a 
temporary basis, almost regardless of its choices. Thus, Equatorial Guinea has discovered 
so much oil that its GDP is growing despite continued predation by a narrow political 
elite; in Sudan, oil-based growth is temporarily robust to state breakdown. But poor 
choices sharply deteriorate the lower tail of growth outcomes, reducing the probability 
that an episode of rapid growth will be sustained over the medium to long term. Figure 3 
implies that being syndrome-free is a necessary condition for sustaining rapid growth 
across periods of good and bad fortune.   
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Hence, the intra-African evidence is consistent with that from the comparison of 
Africa with other regions, although the latter is currently predicated on the extreme 
assumption that the syndromes were unique to Africa.  
In Table 13 we deepen the analysis by investigating differences between the 
syndromes, using the same approach as in Table 12. This reveals a large difference 
between the damage done by state breakdown and the other three syndromes, although all 
four are adverse. Depending on which of the six specifications is adopted, state 
breakdown reduces growth by between 1.8 and 2.0 percentage points. This is consistent 
with the global estimate of the effects of civil war of 2.2 percentage points off the growth 
rate (Collier, 1999). The other three syndromes each generate costs of around one 
percentage point off the growth rate. 
 
 
Table 13. Robust regressions controlling for shocks: all syndromes. 
Dependent variable: growth in real gdp per capita. 
Country fixed effects not included  Country fixed effects 
included  Variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regulatory  -0.972*** -0.900**  -0.944*** -0.902*** -1.626*** -1.627*** 
  0.327 0.377 0.227 0.349 0.347 0.448 
Redistributive -0.983***  -0.783*  -0.952**  -0.774**  -0.723 0.028 
  0.262 0.403 0.415 0.354 0.735 0.474 
Intertemporal  -0.450 -0.851 -0.597 -0.862 -0.048 -0.871 
  0.604 0.708 0.531 0.532 0.837 0.575 
  27Breakdown  -1.767*** -1.973*** -1.788**  -1.963*** -1.872*  -1.986*** 
  0.650 0.443 0.696 0.424 0.989 0.643 
Partner  growth  0.303***  -- 0.309***  -- 0.332***  -- 
  0.106   0.098   0.123   
Rainfall  anomaly  -0.425*  -0.295 -0.379 -0.276 -0.466 -0.396 
  0.231 0.231 0.366 0.200 0.314 0.325 
Coastal  -- -- 0.383  -0.033  -- -- 
    0.378  0.392    
Resrich  -- -- 0.230  -0.036  -- -- 
    0.400  0.352    
N  1492 1770 1492 1770 1492 1770 
Pseudo R
2 0.025 0.047 0.026 0.047 0.062 0.091 
Notes: See Table 12. 
 
 
So far the only basis for the classification of syndromes has been our own subjective 
assessment, drawing on the accounts of the case studies. There are two ways of validating 
these classifications, objective evidence on policies and the subjective judgments of other 
informed observers. In Chapter 3 we follow the former route, assessing the extent to 
which our judgments correspond to objective information. Here we follow the alternative 
route and investigate whether our assessments correspond to other subjective judgments. 
The source we use for this is the annual rating system of World Bank economists, the 
‘Country, Policy and Institutional Assessment’ (CPIA). The advantage of this rating 
system is that it is undertaken globally to a common standard and the series goes back to 
1977. Hence, it is possible to compare Africa with other developing regions. Figure 4 
shows the CPIA by region. The dashed line shows the average CPIA score over the 
period. The bold line shows the evolution of the CPIA year by year. Evidently, the policy 
and institutional environment has on average been judged to be worse in Africa than 
those of other developing regions. 
We first investigate whether within Africa our classification of some periods as 
syndromes corresponds to markedly worse CPIA ratings: that is, within Africa, does our 
judgment correspond to those of other informed observers. In Table 14 we report annual 
panel regressions of the CPIA score on each syndrome. We control for year and for 
country fixed-effects. Table 14 shows that each of the syndromes other than the inter-
temporal is significant in explaining the CPIA score. The intertemporal syndrome is, 
indeed, marginally significant with the wrong sign. Recall that the main inter-temporal 
syndrome is unsustainable growth. We have already noted how pernicious this is from the 
perspective of whether the society correctly judges policy: during the upswing of this 
syndrome growth is rapid. While our disagreement with the CPIA may indicate that our 
judgment of these episodes is unduly adverse, it may instead indicate that during these 
misleading upswings the judgment of World Bank staff was systematically too favorable. 
From Table 14 we can conclude that with the notable exception of these episodes of 
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Table 14. Syndromes and the CPIA: annual panel regressions.  
Dependent variable: CPIA score 
Variable OLS  FE 
Constant  3.442***  3.251*** 
  0.078  0.081 
Soft  -0.149***  -0.333*** 
  0.051  0.068 
Hard  -0.556***  -0.694*** 
  0.068  0.08 
Redistributive  -0.595***  -0.182*** 
  0.055  0.070 
Intertemporal  0.119*  0.085 
  0.066  0.074 
Breakdown  -0.721***  -0.419*** 
  0.076  0.063 
N  1007  1007 
Adjusted R
2 0.290  0.113 
RMSE  0.688  0.513 
F  17.948  7.213 
Prob>F  0.000 0.000 
All regressions include year effects. The FE regression also includes country effects. The panel is 
unbalanced because we use all available observations. The omitted category is syndrome-free. 
 
 
  29Recall that our initial working assumption above has been that other regions did 
not experience policy and institutional dysfunction as severely as Africa: although 
countries elsewhere obviously made policy errors, the syndromes were unique to Africa. 
This working assumption is obviously inaccurate: other regions had countries with some 
deeply dysfunctional policies and institutions. We are now in a position to determine the 
extent to which our assumption is inaccurate. We begin in Table 15 which shows the 
average CPIA score for other regions, that for the years in Africa that were syndrome-
free, and that for those that were subject to one or other of the syndromes. The CPIA is a 
1-5 scoring system, with low scores indicating worse policies and weaker institutions. In 
practice, the range of the scores is very largely confined to 2-4, with 2 indicating 
extremely bad circumstances, and 4 relatively good circumstances. 
Table 15 suggests that our working assumption is not as inaccurate as might have 
been supposed. Taking the means of the CPIA scores, there is no significant difference 
between the entire non-African group and the group of African syndrome-free country-
years. By contrast, there is a large and significant difference between the African 
syndrome years on the one hand and both syndrome-free Africa and other regions, on the 
other. This is true both for the entire period for which we have data, 1977-2000, and for 
each sub-period individually, with the sole exception of 1985-92 when Africa’s 
syndrome-free economies are rated above the economies of other regions, significant at 
5%. Strikingly, for our final period 1993-2000, the CPIA scores for syndrome-free Africa 
(3.30) and for other developing regions (3.34) are virtually identical. This does not imply 
that the syndromes were unique to Africa: obviously they were not. However, it does 
suggest that the greater prevalence and intensity in Africa of the policy problems that 
these syndromes describe may approximate to the extent to which Africa’s policy 
environment was distinctive.  
 
 
Table 15. Overall CPIA score by opportunity group, region and syndrome status. 
Sample statistics  Region or 
period 
 
Mean Std  Dev  Freq 
Tests for difference in means  







BY OPPORTUNITY GROUP        
All non-industrial countries        
CO  3.129 0.798  1449    CO  LL   
LL  2.860 0.769  479  LL  -0.270***  --   
RR  2.956  0.905  620 RR -0.173*** 0.096   
Total  3.036  0.827  2548      0.000 
SSA only             
CO  2.860  0.744  439  CO  LL   
LL  2.701 0.791  309  LL  -0.159**  --   
RR  2.731  0.921  282 RR -0.129  0.03   
Total  2.777  0.812  1030      0.000 
<Table continued below> 
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BY REGION AND SYNDROME STATUS        
All years 1977-2000          
SSA sfr  3.311  0.614  313  SSA  sfr  SSAnfr   
SSA nfr  2.542 0.784  694  SSA  nfr  -0.770***  --   
Other  3.213 0.790  1518 Other -0.099  0.670***   
Total  3.041  0.828  2525      0.000 
1977-84             
SSA sfr  3.363  0.615  43  SSA  sfr  SSAnfr   
SSA nfr  2.715 0.729  260  SSA  nfr  -0.647***  --   
Other  3.264 0.833  424 Other -0.099  0.548***   
Total  3.073  0.829  727      0.007 
1985-92             
SSA sfr  3.318  0.813  77  SSA  sfr  SSAnfr   
SSA nfr  2.516 0.843  262  SSA  nfr  -0.802***  --   
Other  3.009 0.881  492 Other -0.309**  0.493***   
Total  2.882  0.902  831      0.541 
1993-2000             
SSA sfr  3.297  0.518  193  SSA  sfr  SSAnfr   
SSA nfr  2.320 0.709  172  SSA  nfr  -0.977***  --   
Other  3.343 0.634  602 Other 0.046  1.023***   
Total  3.152  0.737  967      0.000 
* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01.  
Notes: SSA sfr and SSA nfr refer to syndrome-free and not-syndrome free. Other refers to all non-SSA 




In Figures 4 and 5 we use the above results to infer the contribution, year-by-year 
of the syndromes to the difference between Africa’s CPIA score and that for other 
developing regions. In Figure 4, the dotted line shows what the CPIA would have been 
for Africa in the absence of the syndromes, based on the regression of the first column of 
Table 14. Derived from this, Figure 5 shows the estimated shortfall in the CPIA for 













































Note: Based on regression in column 1 of Table 14




Table 14 and Figure 5 are merely statements about averages. By definition, none 
of the African syndrome-free years were subject to syndromes, whereas undoubtedly 
some of the non-African countries experienced syndromes. This is indicated by the larger 
standard deviations for the non-African group. While Table 15 suggests that on average 
the difference between Africa and other low-income developing regions is equivalent to 
other regions not having experienced syndromes, evidently other regions did experience 
syndromes. We now infer how the incidence of syndromes evolved in Africa relative to 
other regions. We do this by using the observed relationship between the CPIA and 
syndromes in Africa to predict the incidence in other regions, through probit analysis.
6 
The results by decade are shown in Table 16. 
Due to well known limitations of probit models, the overall incidence is of less 
interest than the trend. What is striking is that the predicted incidence of syndromes in 
other developing regions more than halves between the late 1970s and the 1990s. By 
contrast, the predicted incidence of syndromes in Africa falls much less sharply, by 
around a third. Other regions most surely suffered from syndromes, but they appear to 
have escaped from them much more rapidly. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Estimation is for SSA country/years with cpia values 1977-2000. The estimated coefficient on cpia in a 
probit for syndrome-free status is 0.802 with standard error 0.071 (significant at the 1% level). This implies 
that a one-unit increase in cpia increases the probability of syndrome-free status by 24.9 percent. The probit 
equation includes a full set of year effects. The pseudo-R
2 is 0.2081 and the Wald chi
2 for overall fit is 
182.27, with prob>chi
2 of 0.000.  
  32Table 16. Predicted incidence of syndromes over time, by region. 
Period 
and Region  Row proportion  Column 
proportion 
1977-2000  Not free  Free  Total 
Other  55.27 44.73 57.22 
SSA  69.43 30.57 42.78 
Total  61.33 38.67  100 
1977-1979  Not free  Free  Total 
Other  81.51 18.49 51.05 
SSA  85.00 15.00 48.95 
Total  83.22 16.78  100 
1980-89  Not free  Free  Total 
Other  82.65 17.35 55.32 
SSA  84.26 15.74 44.68 
Total  83.37 16.63  100 
1990-2000  Not free  Free  Total 
Other  30.25 69.75 60.08 
SSA  52.00 48.00 39.92 
Total  38.94 61.06  100 
Notes: Predictions are from a probit regression of syndrome-free status on the cpia score, for all SSA 
country/years with available cpia values 1977-2000. The estimated coefficient on cpia is 1.025, with a 
standard error of 0.079 (significant at the 1% level). This implies that a one-unit increase in cpia increases 
the probability of syndrome-free status by 31.5 percent. The probit equation includes a full set of year 
effects. The pseudo R
2 is 0.3102 and the Wald chi
2 for overall fit is 256.80, with prob>chi
2 of 0.000. 
 
 
Syndromes and the Foreclosing of Opportunities 
 
We have suggested that different countries of Africa have faced different opportunities: 
that successful growth strategies during the period we analyze would inevitably have 
differed across the region. The coastal but resource-poor economies had the chance to 
follow the labor-intensive manufacturing route; the resource-rich economies needed to 
have effective public spending; while the landlocked resource-poor economies were 
dependent upon successful growth strategies in their neighbors. We now develop these 
hypotheses and subject them to some testing.  
 
Resource-Poor Coastal Economies 
 
We start with the coastal, resource-poor economies. Recall that this is indeed the biggest 
single factor in Africa’s growth divergence with other regions. Further, the gap in 
performance between Africa and other regions in this opportunity category only really 
opens up from the 1980s and then rapidly becomes dramatically wide. This is at least 
consistent with the timing of Asia’s breakthrough into labor-intensive manufactured and 
service exports. The first issue we investigate is whether the population-weighted 
divergence of Africa and other developing regions in this opportunity category is entirely 
driven by China and India. Of course, even if this is the case, the divergence is a real 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is important to establish whether the exceptional 
  33phenomenon is the take-off of these two populous countries relative to all other low-
income coastal resource-poor countries, or whether the exceptional phenomenon is the 
divergence of Africa. Table 17 compares the performance of African and other coastal 
resource-poor economies, with various exclusions from the non-Africa group. The key 
part is the fourth column of Table 17.2 which compares Africa with other economies that 
were low-income in the mid-1970s but which excludes China and India. The growth 
differential is indeed lower than when China and India are included, but it is still 
substantial, and it is still much higher post-1980 than pre-1980. Pre-1980 the differential 
is only around 1.3 percentage points, whereas post-1980 it is around 3.0 percentage 
points. There is thus some basis for concluding that Africa’s coastal, resource-poor 
economies did indeed diverge massively from somewhat similar economies elsewhere 
after 1980. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of economic development during our period is 
that, beginning in around 1980, developing countries have succeeded in breaking into the 
global market in manufactures, a change which became explosive. Between 1980 and 
2000 the share of manufactures in developing countries exports rose from 25% to 80%. 
Such explosive growth is consistent with the industrial agglomeration models of 
Krugman and Venables, with an initial agglomeration advantage for the rich countries 
being breached as the wage differential widened to a critical threshold. In these models, 
once industry begins to relocate, the initial agglomeration advantage declines and so 
growth in the ‘South’ – or at least in that part of it where industry initially chose to locate 
– explosively catches up the North. The role of the syndromes in closing off the 
opportunity to break into manufactured exports at the crucial time before Asia established 
economies of agglomeration is thus a contending explanation for why coastal Africa did 
not participate in this process. During the decade of the 1980s the coastal resource-scarce 
economies of Africa were virtually all in the grip of one or other of the syndromes. Going 
through the countries in the coastal, resource-poor category, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal 
were handicapped by the combination of minimum wage laws and the Franc Zone, which 
prevented them inflating away from uncompetitive real wages. Mozambique, Ethiopia, 
and Sierra Leone were war-torn. Sudan, as well as being periodically war torn, is, as 
Sachs would argue, scarcely a coastal economy, since the overwhelming bulk of its 
population and its cities are landlocked. South Africa was entering a period of anticipated 
redistribution and consequent high uncertainty. The remaining economies in the category 
were Ghana, Kenya, Guinea, Mauritius and Tanzania. Of these, Ghana emerged from 
syndromes during the late 1980s and it is an important question to what extent by the end 
of our period it had succeeded in diversifying its exports. Tanzania emerged from 
syndromes a little later than Ghana and so the same question applies. Kenya was in the 
grip of regional redistribution for the entire post-1980 period. Only Mauritius was 
syndrome free for the entire post-1980 period. It did indeed succeed in breaking into 
manufactured and service exports and become a middle-income economy. 
 
 
Table 17. Coastal, resource-poor economies compared. 
Decade  Developing countries  Low-income developing countries
*
  34 
All  Excluding China 
and India  All  Excluding China 
and India 
Number of countries         
  Other SSA Other SSA Other SSA Other  SSA 
1960s  46.7 24 44.7 24  11  17  9  17 
1970s  41 21.1 39 21.1 10 14.8  8  14.8 
1980s  39 17.9 37 17.9 10 12.9  8  12.9 
1990-2000  39 16.9 37 16.9 10 12.4  8  12.4 
Total  41.2 19.8 39.2 19.8 10.2 14.1  8.2  14.1 
Population-weighted growth differential (Other minus SSA)    
1960s  0.89 1.34 1.05  1.22 
1970s  1.86 1.87 1.72  0.52 
1980s  5.53 2.61 6.39  3.89 
1990-2000  4.46 1.75 4.98  1.96 
Total  3.28 1.90 3.63  1.92 
Notes: 
*Low-income economies are those whose average PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita between 1973 
and 1977 was below $2450 at 1996 international prices.  
 
 
We next investigate whether there is a statistical relationship between the extent 
to which Africa’s resource-scarce coastal economies expanded their manufactured and 
service exports and the extent to which they avoided the syndromes. Specifically, we 
consider whether the number of years that an economy was free from syndromes post-
1979 is significant in explaining the trend in the share on manufactured and service 
exports in GDP. When we aggregate all the syndromes many of the countries are 
concentrated around zero years syndrome-free. To remedy this loss of variation we also 
consider only the regulatory syndrome which is both the most common one for the 
coastal economies and also probably the most destructive for export opportunities. We 
consider manufacturing and service exports both separately and together. Figure 6 graphs 
the relationship and Table 18 reports the regression results. The persistence of the 
regulatory syndrome in the resource-scarce coastal economies is indeed significant in 
reducing the growth of manufacturing exports, service exports, and their combination.  
Despite the lack of variation, the persistence of the totality of syndromes is also 
significant except for manufactured exports. Not only are the results statistically 
significant, they are large. Because our dependent variable is the trend in exports, an 
implication is that the effect of removing the syndromes is gradual and cumulative. By 
the end of two decades, the difference between a country such as Mauritius, which was 
free of the syndrome for the entire period, and a country such as Togo which maintained 
the syndrome for 21 of the 24 years covered in Table 18, is predicted to be 
 28.5 percent of GDP (for manufacturing + service exports). 
However, an out-of-sample extrapolation would imply that this is a widening difference: 
Mauritius is on an export growth path, whereas Togo is not. 
= ⋅ ) 068 . 0 21 ( * 20 years
 
 
  35Table 18. African coastal economies: syndrome status and export diversification, 
1980-2000.  









Constant  0.147* 0.025  -0.091 -0.275 -0.067 -0.312 
  0.069 0.068 0.215 0.193 0.33  0.299 
Years syndrome-free  0.012  -- 0.034*  -- 0.078*  -- 
  0.007   0.016   0.04   
Years control-free  -- 0.015***  -- 0.048**  -- 0.091** 
   0.005   0.016   0.037 
N  15 15 13 13 13 13 
Adjusted R
2 0.046 0.236 0.237 0.508 0.276 0.379 
RMSE  0.216 0.193 0.396 0.318 0.814 0.754 
F  1.666 6.822 4.831 8.114 3.429 5.96 
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6.4: Trend in non-primary exports
Note: See Table 18.
Coastal SSA, 1979-2000




  36Resource-Rich Economies 
 
Turning to the second of our questions, recall that in the 1960s there were virtually no 
resource-rich economies in Africa. However, post-1970, when such economies started to 
become more common, only a small minority have been syndrome-free. Indeed, even 
during the 1990s of the 30% of Africa’s population living in resource-rich economies, all 
but 4% were living with one or other of the syndromes. The most frequent syndromes in 
the resource-rich economies were redistributive and inter-temporal. Indeed, the two 
syndromes often co-existed: for example, the government would borrow internationally 
in order to magnify its transfers to its favored group.  
Although almost all of Africa’s resource-rich economies failed to harness their 
potential for growth, Botswana stands out as an extraordinary exception analogous to 
Mauritius among the coastal economies. Botswana maintained standards of governance 
that enabled it to use its resource wealth to attain middle-income status, growing 
exceptionally fast even by global standards. Evidently, globally resource wealth posed 
problems for governance, but with the exception of Botswana the other African resource-
rich countries did significantly worse than the global average. Why might this have 
happened? 
Resource wealth poses in its starkest form the choice between public goods and 
transfers. A result already well-established in the literature is that when small, clearly-
defined groups hold power they have an incentive to prioritize transfers over the public 
good of growth (Adam and O’Connell, 1992). Ethnicity is obviously the most potent such 
social cleavage. Hence theory would predict that ethnic diversity makes autocracy 
particularly damaging: the power base for the autocracy being a single ethnic group, there 
is a strong incentive for redistribution over growth. This prediction is consistent with the 
global econometric evidence. Although there is usually no clear relationship between 
democracy and growth, once ethnic diversity is introduced as an interaction with 
democracy, there is a clear and substantial effect: democracy promotes growth in the 
context of ethnic diversity (Collier, 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004). Further, 
globally, resource rents significantly increase the probability of autocracy (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005). 
African societies are distinctively different from those of other regions in two 
respects that are pertinent for these global relationships. First, as is well-known, they are 
characterized by atypically high ethnic diversity. Secondly, during our period, they have 
been atypically prone to autocracy. The implication of these characteristics and the above 
global relationships is that we would indeed expect Africa’s resource-rich economies to 
have differentially worse performance than other regions. On this explanation, Africa’s 
resource-rich countries underperformed those of other regions because they were more 
likely to be characterized by the toxic combination of ethnic diversity and autocracy. This 
is borne out in Table 19 which measures the political regime and ethnic diversity by 
opportunity group and decade both for Africa and for other regions. We present the 
results both unweighted and with population weights: the former are more pertinent as a 
description of the typical country, and the latter for growth outcomes. Our key interest is 
the conjunction of high ethnic diversity with low democracy. Using standard scoring 
systems we first consider the average of this ratio over the entire forty years. The result is 
striking: among the six categories generated by the three opportunity groups and the 
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On the unweighted data the different is dramatic: for Africa’s resource-rich countries the 
ratio is more than double that of other regions, though for the weighted data the 
difference is narrower. Turning to the decade-by-decade data, we see that the 1960s are 
anomalous. During 1970-2000 Africa’s resource-rich countries were consistently far 
more characterized by the cocktail of high ethnic diversity and low democracy than both 
the other African opportunity groups and the resource-rich countries of other regions. 
Finally, looking to the underlying ethnic diversity and democracy scores, we see that this 
was generally driven both by higher diversity and by lower democracy. By the 1990s, 
although globally the resource-rich countries were lagging behind in terms of 
democratization, outside Africa such countries were substantially more democratic than 
their African counterparts.  
As we argue in the chapter on inter-temporal syndromes, there may be a further 
catch: democracy is prone to malfunction in the context of resource wealth. Empirically, 
the global relationship between resource wealth, democracy and growth is adverse: when 
resource rents are substantial democracy significantly reduces growth (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005). One explanation for this result is that resource rents tend to subvert 
democracy by providing the finance that makes patronage politics the dominating 
electoral strategy. Collier and Hoeffler show that empirically the problem of democracy 
in the context of resource rents comes only from electoral competition; checks and 
balances, the other feature of democracy, are differentially beneficial to growth in the 
context of resource rents. Presumably, sufficient checks and balances make patronage 
politics infeasible even in the context of resource wealth. Hence, it is not democracy per 
se, but rather the type of democracy that matters: resource-rich societies need a form of 
democracy characterized by checks and balances rather than by intense electoral 
competition. This happens to describe Botswana. Electoral competition is rather limited: 
despite continuous democracy there has never been a change of government. Yet, perhaps 
because democracy has been continuous, the non-electoral checks and balances that work 
through due process have never been undermined. Nigeria under Shagari, although also a 
democracy, was clearly at the other end of the spectrum: a brief period of electoral 
competition in a context in which due process had already collapsed under previous 
military regimes. The Shagari regime presided over the single most important missed 
opportunity for growth that resource-rich Africa has had during our period.  
 
Resource-Scarce Landlocked Economies 
 
Finally, we turn to the landlocked, resource-poor economies. Our hypothesis here is that 
globally the performance of such economies should be dependent upon whether more 
fortunately endowed neighbors are growing. This is because the most obvious growth 
strategy for such a country is to service the markets of its neighbors. In Table 20 we test 
this hypothesis both for other regions and for Africa in a growth regression. To check 
robustness we use three approaches, OLS, IV, and LAD (the LAD regressions are in 
appendix Table A3). Globally, the growth of neighbors matters, which is unsurprising. 
Further, globally the landlocked, resource-poor economies indeed are more dependent 
than other economies on the growth of their neighbors: from the OLS results, whereas the 
typical growth spillover of an additional one percentage point on the growth rate of 
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points. However, all African economies depart from this global pattern: neighborhood 
growth spillovers are much weaker, and indeed for Africa’s landlocked, resource-poor 
countries there are no significant neighborhood growth spillovers.   
 
 
Table 19. Democracy and ethnic fractionalization by opportunity category and 
decade. 
Unweighted Population-weighted  Variable, region 
and decade  CO LL RR CO LL RR 
Polity 4 democracy score       
SSA 1960s  2.11 1.35 1.57 2.84 1.77 2.55 
 1970s  1.53 0.68 0.98 1.39 0.77 0.91 
 1980s  1.47 0.60 0.88 1.44 1.22 2.35 
 1990-2000  3.23 1.97 2.16 3.44 1.65 1.10 
  Total  2.07 1.15 1.41 2.26 1.36 1.54 
Other  1960s  3.22 0.10 2.50 3.36 0.08 1.16 
  1970s  2.88 0.00 1.99 3.18 0.00 0.72 
  1980s  3.68 0.42 2.76 3.37 1.36 1.13 
  1990-2000  5.71 4.02 3.69 4.43 5.64 2.24 
  Total  3.89 1.20 2.85 3.60 1.76 1.38 
Ethnic fractionalization index
*      
SSA 1960s  68.06 57.00 68.80 77.43 64.69 74.57 
 1970s  67.12 57.45 68.40 73.73 64.85 84.06 
 1980s  64.62 57.50 71.20 72.31 64.85 84.38 
 1990-2000  64.39 58.08 71.20 72.96 65.81 84.38 
  Total  66.21 57.52 70.20 74.54 65.12 83.88 
Other  1960s  32.64 50.67 37.29 62.18 61.49 46.17 
  1970s  31.74 46.33 40.59 61.40 59.57 59.89 
  1980s  29.58 42.00 45.15 61.55 59.57 59.31 
  1990-2000  29.58 42.00 45.15 61.55 59.57 59.31 
  Total  30.93 45.79 42.85 61.68 60.14 58.09 
Ratio:  Ethnic fractionalization/(1 + democracy score)    
SSA  1960s  50.67 51.44 46.54 49.29 51.54 35.15 
  1970s  51.78 51.48 59.48 58.91 58.77 74.70 
  1980s  45.56 49.00 63.62 55.83 50.43 61.78 
  1990-2000  33.83 40.81 43.75 38.62 46.04 64.55 
  Total  46.20 47.83 54.19 51.37 51.13 65.22 
Other  1960s  16.12 46.13 23.93 18.81 58.40 44.45 
  1970s  17.92 46.33 28.72 14.70 59.57 57.33 
  1980s  13.92 20.48 27.44 13.88 25.20 52.82 
  1990-2000  7.04 6.61  19.72  8.39 9.45  43.07 
  Total  13.68 31.78 24.74 13.95 38.86 50.01 
Notes: The table uses all countries with at least 30 years of data on the democracy index between 1960 and 
2000.  
*The fractionalization index applies to the early 1960s and is time-invariant. Averages change over 
time as the country composition varies by opportunity category. 
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Dependent variable: growth of real GDP per capita. 
OLS regressions  IV regressions
*
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Landlocked  (LL)  -1.003*** -1.003*** -1.633*** -1.118*** -1.136*** -1.942** 
  0.291 0.291 0.526 0.298 0.299 0.794 
Resource-rich  (RR)  -0.819*** -0.821*** -0.746**  -0.649** -0.643** -0.533 
  0.306 0.306 0.341 0.318 0.319 0.423 
Island  1.852*** 1.852*** 1.777*** 2.378*** 2.413*** 2.252*** 
  0.253 0.253 0.267 0.309 0.311 0.341 
Neighbor  growth  0.428*** 0.428*** 0.392*** 0.719*** 0.742*** 0.659*** 
  0.046 0.046 0.06  0.11 0.113  0.14 
CO*SSA  -0.967*** -0.957*** -1.027*** -0.382 -0.4  -0.549 
  0.299 0.304 0.319 0.362 0.425 0.453 
LL*SSA 0.002  -0.017  0.546  0.68 0.727  1.381* 
  0.426 0.427 0.571 0.505 0.514 0.822 
RR*SSA  0.361 0.317 0.178 0.69 0.985  0.728 
  0.57 0.57 0.573  0.597 0.645 0.654 
Island*SSA  -0.765 -0.774 -0.699 -1.394** -1.373*  -1.218* 
  0.638 0.641 0.646 0.664 0.703 0.714 
Neighbor  growth*LL  -- -- 0.318**  -- -- 0.418 
  -- -- 0.157  -- -- 0.309 
Neighbor  growth*RR  -- -- -0.083  -- -- -0.135 
  -- -- 0.09  -- -- 0.211 
Nbr growth*CO*SSA  --  -0.313***  -0.278***  -- -0.529*  -0.463 
 --  0.085  0.093  -- 0.312  0.317 
Nbr growth*LL*SSA  --  -0.181**  -0.462***  -- -0.579  -0.925* 
 --  0.091  0.165  -- 0.434  0.51 
Nbr growth*RR*SSA  --  -0.391***  -0.270**  -- -0.097  0.117 
 --  0.128  0.137  -- 0.282  0.313 
Nbr growth*SSA  -0.304***  --  --  -0.584*** --  -- 
 0.072  --  --  0.119 --  -- 
Dry  year  -0.302 -0.304 -0.322 -0.305 -0.236 -0.268 
  0.212 0.212 0.211 0.216 0.233 0.233 
N  5620 5620 5620 5399 5399 5399 
R2_a  0.097 0.098 0.101 0.084 0.07  0.078 
Rmse  6.263 6.262 6.249 6.338 6.389 6.361 
F  9.800 9.494 9.234 9.22 8.849  8.731 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. All regressions include a full set of year effects. 
*Instruments for 
variables involving neighbor growth are the first and second lags of all such variables. 
 
 
The most likely explanation for this striking result is that Africa’s internal barriers 
to trade are much higher than other regions. This is consistent with evidence on both the 
actual practice of trade policies and the very high level of transport costs. The differential 
lack of a growth spillover effect for Africa’s landlocked economies, contrasted with the 
differentially large effect for such economies elsewhere, suggests that such barriers may 
be atypically high even by African standards. This is plausible: being landlocked not only 
raises costs of transport to global markets but also raises them to other African markets.  
  40Paradoxically, to date this isolation of Africa’s landlocked, resource-poor 
economies from their neighborhoods has not mattered very much for their growth. 
Although as a group these countries have grown more slowly than their more fortunately 
endowed neighbors, the gap has been much narrower than that in other regions. The lack 
of integration of Africa’s landlocked economies matters more for the future when its 
more fortunate countries indeed succeed in harnessing their opportunities. Then, in an 
ideal world, the landlocked, resource-poor would be carried along by the growth of their 
neighbors, as in other regions. In Africa, on past levels of integration, even when the 
countries with better opportunities succeed in harnessing them, there is going to be no 
such spillover effect. The most credible growth prospect for the poorest countries of 
Africa is currently closed off by the region’s internal barriers. 
 
4. A Preliminary Conclusion 
 
Misunderstanding the past makes it harder to change the future. What have we learnt 
from this chapter that might be helpful for the shaping of African development strategies? 
 
Understanding the past 
 
Changing Africa’s future from the trends of 1960-2000 is evidently of global concern: the 
region was stagnant during a period of unprecedented global growth. It is currently 
fashionable to come up with single explanations for this massive failure of the growth 
process: the region is irretrievably aid-dependent (Lal, 1999); it has uniquely unfavorable 
geography (Gallup and Sachs, 1997; Sachs et al, 2005); it has inherited dysfunctional 
institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). We have argued that such 
explanations ignore important variation: geographic opportunities differed across Africa, 
and choices also differed. While introducing variation we have been parsimonious: 
Africa’s 48 countries and 40 years of behavior—1920 observations—have been collapsed 
into three opportunity groups and a choice between being syndrome-free and four 
syndromes.  
Our foremost objective has, of course, been to provide an account of the past 
failure of the growth process. The annual growth shortfall to be explained is 3.5 
percentage points. 
Of this, we attribute around one percentage point to Africa’s inherently inferior growth 
opportunities: its population is heavily skewed away from the fast-growth opportunity of 
being resource-scarce and coastal. We attribute nearly two percentage points to the 
damage done by one or other of the four policy syndromes: regulatory, inter-temporal, 
redistributive, and state breakdown. The shortfall in Africa’s policies and institutions 
relative to other regions was closely equivalent to the effect of these syndromes. 
Our account of the failure of the growth process is thus in essence as follows. 
Globally, there have been two autonomous paths to middle-income status. Resource-rich 
economies can succeed, but since such economies will necessarily have a large state, the 
critical governance issue is how the state spends money. Coast, resource-scarce 
economies can also succeed, but since their success depends upon keeping costs at 
globally competitive levels, the critical governance issue is that the state should not be 
predatory upon the export sector. The landlocked resource-scarce economies lack an 
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their growth opportunities. Conditional upon this, such economies succeed by integrating 
within their region, servicing their fast-growing neighbors. 
In Africa, the relative balance of autonomous growth opportunities was distinctive 
because the two paths were equally important whereas globally the labor-intensive 
exports path was far more important. Africa’s socio-political structure was unusually ill-
suited to this importance of resource wealth. Globally, the cocktail of resource-wealth, 
ethnic diversity and autocracy has usually been toxic for growth. This manifested itself as 
a high incidence of the redistributive and inter-temporal syndromes in these economies. 
The resource-scarce coastal economies were disproportionately prone to the regulatory 
syndrome. During the critical decade of the 1980s, when these countries could potentially 
have matched Asia in breaking in to new global markets, only Mauritius was syndrome-
free. Since the 1980s it has become much harder to follow this growth path because of 
the agglomeration economies now built up by China and India. Nevertheless, those 
African coastal economies that have escaped from syndromes have started to succeed in 
new export markets. Africa’s resource-scarce landlocked economies have faced a triple-
bind. Their more fortunate neighbors had usually foreclosed their growth opportunities 
through one or other of the syndromes. Over-and-above this, the land countries faced 
transport and policy barriers to regional integration that made it difficult to latch onto 
neighboring success in the rare cases where it occurred. Perhaps the prevailing stagnation 
reduced the political incentive for integration. Finally, the landlocked economies were 
disproportionately prone to the syndromes. Again, this might have been because, lacking 
a viable growth strategy, there was less incentive to avoid them. 
Because of the radically greater importance of countries with resource wealth and 
countries that lacked such wealth and were landlocked, Africa’s needed priorities were 
distinctive. The region needed to make the ‘big state’ work effectively, and it needed 
regional integration. Whether external policy pressure has had much effect is beyond our 
scope, but we note that these two issues have not been its priorities. External priorities 
towards the state have been to reduce its size, and towards trade they have been external 
liberalization. These priorities were probably appropriate predominantly for the minority 
of economies that were coastal, resource-scarce. 
 
Facing the Future 
 
We close by speculating about Africa’s future growth. Clearly, on our thesis the 
syndromes have been the proximate impediments to African growth. Hence, the first 
priority is to avoid them. This may be extremely difficult because some of them may 
develop a trap-like persistence. Options for avoidance are discussed in the chapters 
devoted to each specific syndrome. Here our main concern is the implications of an 
environment beyond the syndromes. The key issue is whether, by avoiding the 
syndromes, Africa can replicate the success of other regions. Again we start from the two 
autonomous growth strategies.  
Were the resource-rich countries to avoid the syndromes there seems no reason 
why they could not grow. Botswana is the practical demonstration of this possibility. 
However, it may be extremely difficult for the rest of resource-rich Africa to follow this 
path. We have argued that in the African context autocracies are likely to handle resource 
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unless they are able to construct effective checks and balances though due process. Such 
checks and balances are not an automatic concomitant of electoral competition, and 
democratic patronage politics has no incentive to construct them. Worse, the corruption 
that is at the center of the problems of these societies may be highly persistent (Tirole, 
1996). Thus, the legacy of the syndromes might be trap of corruption.  
Were the resource-scarce coastal economies now to escape the syndromes it is 
much more of an open question whether they would match the growth of other regions. 
During the 1990s even those economies that avoided the syndromes grew markedly less 
rapidly than other regions. There are three broad explanations for this shortfall. One is 
simply that there are inevitable lags between reform and private investment. On our 
evidence, after a decade of being syndrome-free such economies can expect to be raising 
their share of manufactured and service exports in GDP at around 0.2 percentage points a 
year, and after two decades at around 0.4 percentage points a year: success is 
accelerating. A second explanation is more disturbing: coastal Africa has missed the 
boat. Whereas in the 1980s Africa could have broken into global markets, now that Asia 
is established, Africa has no comparative advantage in labor costs to offset its 
disadvantage in the lack of agglomeration. If this is right, coastal Africa must look 
elsewhere for growth, perhaps by emulating Latin America in adding value to its 
resource-based exports. On the third explanation the avoidance of syndromes is necessary 
but insufficient for success in new exports. Success requires some positive actions by the 
state, such as the provision of infrastructure or education. In our view there is currently 
insufficient evidence decisively to reject any of these three explanations with radically 
different implications. 
On the basis of our analysis of the past, The resource-scarce landlocked 
economies have little prospect of a growth path to middle-income status until their more 
fortunate neighbors succeed. Even then, they are dependent upon infrastructure and trade 
policies that integrate their economies with their neighbors, and this evidently requires 
the cooperation of their neighbors. This may be overly pessimistic. The growth 
opportunities for resource-scarce landlocked economies may be transformed through two 
new opportunities. First, there is a whole new class of service exports that are not 
significantly handicapped by being landlocked. Secondly, many landlocked countries 
have untapped natural resource wealth and can transform themselves into resource-rich 
economies.  
Thus, while the analysis of the past offers some guidance, it leaves major 
uncertainties. A safety-first strategy would evidently allow for these uncertainties. Given 
the uncertainty attaching to autonomous processes of governance reform in the resource-
rich countries, and the importance of such reform for the resource-scarce landlocked 
economies, the latter have good reason to attempt to reinforce internal processes of 
reform with neighborhood pressure through the African Union. Given the uncertainty 
attaching to the prospect of coastal economies breaking into export markets, governments 
would be wise to adopt a maximal strategy: taking positive actions beyond avoiding the 
syndromes. Given the uncertainty of other options, the resource-scarce landlocked 
economies would be wise to encourage resource prospecting, and to invest in the 
facilities necessary for the new service exports.   
  43Achieving growth in Africa is thus unlikely to be an easy matter for its societies. 
For different reasons, Botswana and Mauritius are deceptive models for growth. Africa’s 
resource-rich economies will find it extremely difficult to construct the checks and 
balances that have enabled Botswana to grow. Africa’s coastal economies will find the 
global market much more difficult to penetrate than did Mauritius which broke in before 
low-income Asia was established and additionally benefited from substantial protection 
from Asian competition. The third of Africa’s population that is in resource-scarce 
landlocked economies with consequently reduced opportunities has no parallel in other 
regions. However, actions at the country, regional and international level would each be 
improved by recognizing the distinctiveness of the opportunities and problems that Africa 
faces. 
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  45Table A1. Global sample for growth in real GDP per capita. 












SSA: Coastal         
Benin 1  1 4.71 0.63 . 
Cape Verde  1  1 0.34 3.43 . 
Comoros 1  1 0.43 -0.18 . 
Cote d’Ivoire  1  1 11.80 0.57 . 
Gambia, The  1  1 0.93 0.92 . 
Ghana 1  1 15.14 -0.21 . 
Guinea-Bissau 1  1 0.95 -0.58 . 
Kenya 1  1 23.35 1.23 . 
Madagascar 1  1 11.63 -1.11 . 
Mauritius 1  1 1.06 3.70 . 
Mozambique 1  1 14.15 -0.38 . 
Senegal 1  1 7.33 -0.24 . 
Seychelles 1  1 0.07 2.35 . 
South Africa  1  1 35.20 0.88 . 
Tanzania 1  1 25.47 1.83 . 
Togo 1  1 3.45 0.86 . 
Djibouti 0  0 0.47 -4.80 . 
E r i t r e a  0   03 . 1 42 . 4 8 .  
Sao Tome and Principe  0  0 0.12 -1.06 . 
Somalia 0  0 7.16 . . 
SSA: Landlocked         
Burkina Faso  1  1 8.88 1.25 . 
Burundi 1  1 5.46 0.20 . 
Central African Republic  1  1 2.94 -0.75 . 
Chad 1  1 5.75 -0.72 . 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1  1 37.00 -3.35 . 
Ethiopia 1  1 51.18 0.41 1994
†
Lesotho 1  1 1.68 3.57 . 
M a l a w i  1   18 . 5 11 . 3 6 .  
Mali 1  1 8.46 -0.27 . 
Niger 1  1 7.71 -1.65 . 
Rwanda 1  1 6.94 -0.33 . 
Sudan 1  1 24.82 0.75 . 
Uganda 1  1 16.33 1.40 . 
Zimbabwe 1  1 10.24 0.71 . 
SSA: Resource-rich         
Angola 1  1 9.57 -1.23 1974 
Botswana 1  1 1.28 6.33 1970 
Cameroon 1  1 11.61 0.66 1979 
Congo, Rep.  1  1 2.23 1.33 1974 
Equatorial Guinea  1  1 0.35 2.21 1996 
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SSA Resource-rich, cont’d   
Gabon 1  1 0.94 2.21 1960 
Guinea 1  1 5.76 0.02 1974 
Liberia 1  1 2.43 -3.49 1960 
Mauritania 1  1 1.99 1.30 1960 
Namibia 1  1 1.38 0.62 1979 
Nigeria 1  1 96.20 0.32 1971 
Sierra Leone  1  1 4.00 -1.36 1960 
Zambia 1  1 7.78 -1.25 1960 
Swaziland 0  0 0.77 2.03 1960 
LAC: Coastal         
Argentina 1  1 32.53 0.95 . 
Bahamas, The  1  1 0.26 1.33 . 
Barbados 1  1 0.26 2.67 . 
B e l i z e  1   10 . 1 92 . 9 1 .  
Brazil 1  1 147.96 2.44 . 
Colombia 1  1 34.97 1.82 . 
Costa Rica  1  1 3.05 1.76 . 
Dominican Republic  1  1 7.06 2.75 . 
El Salvador  1  1 5.11 0.74 . 
Guatemala 1  1 8.75 1.30 . 
Haiti 1  1 6.47 -0.99 . 
Honduras 1  1 4.87 0.82 . 
Jamaica 1  1 2.39 0.54 . 
Mexico 1  1 83.23 2.11 . 
Nicaragua 1  1 3.82 -0.87 . 
Panama 1  1 2.40 2.02 . 
Peru 1  1 21.57 0.56 . 
Puerto Rico  1  1 3.54 3.62 . 
St Vincent & Grenadines  1  1 0.11 4.79 . 
Uruguay 1  1 3.11 1.14 . 
Antigua and Barbuda  0  0 0.06 4.40 . 
Bermuda 0  0 .  .  . 
Cuba 0  0 10.63 -2.45 . 
Dominica 0  0 0.07 3.17 . 
Grenada 0  0 0.09 4.00 . 
St. Kitts and Nevis  0  0 0.04 5.08 . 
St. Lucia  0  0 0.13 3.22 . 
LAC: Landlocked         
Paraguay 1  1 4.15 1.62 . 
LAC: Resource-rich         
Bolivia 1  1 6.57 0.35 1970 
Chile 1  1 13.10 2.48 1970 
Ecuador 1  1 10.26 1.52 1974 
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SASIA: Coastal         
Guyana 1  1 0.73 0.81 1960 
Trinidad and Tobago  1  1 1.22 2.59 1960 
Venezuela, RB  1  1 19.50 -0.30 1960 
Suriname 0  0 0.40 0.60 1960 
Bangladesh 1  1 110.03 1.36 . 
India 1  1 849.52 2.30 . 
Pakistan 1  1 107.98 2.62 . 
Sri Lanka  1  1 16.27 2.88 . 
SASIA: Landlocked         
Nepal 1  1 18.14 1.38 . 
Bhutan 0  0 0.60 4.16 . 
SASIA: Resource-rich    
<no cases>           
EAP: Coastal         
China 1  1 1135.19 5.42 . 
Fiji 1  1 0.74 1.66 . 
Hong Kong, China  1  1 5.70 5.26 . 
Korea, Rep.  1  1 42.87 5.75 . 
Philippines 1  1 61.04 1.16 . 
Singapore 1  1 3.05 5.92 . 
Taiwan, China  1  1 20.23 6.37 . 
Thailand 1  1 55.60 4.51 . 
Cambodia 0  0 9.15 2.33 . 
Macao, China  0  0 0.37 2.18 . 
Vietnam 0  0 66.20 4.33 . 
EAP: Landlocked         
Lao PDR  0  0 4.13 2.88 . 
Mongolia 0  0 2.11 0.52 . 
EAP: Resource-rich         
Indonesia 1  1 178.23 3.51 1970 
Malaysia 1  1 18.20 3.98 1976 
Papua New Guinea  1  1 3.98 1.30 1972 
MENAT: Coastal         
Cyprus 1  1 0.68 4.40 . 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1  1 52.44 3.05 . 
I s r a e l  1   14 . 6 62 . 9 4 .  
Jordan 1  1 3.17 1.15 . 
M a l t a  1   10 . 3 65 . 4 2 .  
Morocco 1  1 24.04 1.69 . 
Turkey 1  1 56.15 2.29 . 
Lebanon 0  0 3.63 1.34 . 
MENAT: Landlocked         
<no cases>     
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MENAT: Resource-rich   
Algeria 1  1 25.02 0.86 1960 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  1  1 54.40 1.50 1960 
Oman 1  1 1.63 5.35 1967 
Saudi Arabia  1  1 15.80 1.46 1960 
Syrian Arab Republic  1  1 12.12 2.28 1974 
Tunisia 1  1 8.15 3.02 1974 
Kuwait 0  1 2.13 -3.70 1960 
Bahrain 0  0 0.50 0.14 1960 
Iraq 0  0 18.08 . 1960 
Qatar 0  0 0.49 . 1960 
United Arab Emirates  0  0 1.84 -3.90 1973 
Yemen, Rep.  0  0 11.88 1.51 1990 
EEFSU: Coastal         
Romania 1  1 23.21 1.94 . 
Georgia 0  1 5.46 -0.80 . 
Latvia 0  1 2.67 1.82 . 
Russian Federation  0  1 148.29 1.54 . 
Bulgaria 0  0 8.72 0.73 . 
Croatia 0  0 4.77 -0.55 . 
Estonia 0  0 1.57 0.49 . 
Lithuania 0  0 3.70 -3.28 . 
Poland 0  0 38.12 2.65 . 
Slovenia 0  0 2.00 1.88 . 
Ukraine 0  0 51.89 -6.17 . 
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.  0  0 10.53 .  . 
EEFSU: Landlocked         
Hungary 1  1 10.36 3.17 . 
Armenia 0  0 3.55 -4.58 . 
Belarus 0  0 10.19 -1.02 . 
Czech Republic  0  0 10.36 0.21 . 
Kyrgyz Republic  0  0 4.42 -2.53 . 
Macedonia, FYR  0  0 1.90 -0.78 . 
Moldova 0  0 4.36 -4.22 . 
Slovak Republic  0  0 5.28 0.58 . 
Tajikistan 0  0 5.30 -7.92 . 
EEFSU: Resource-rich         
Albania 0  0 3.28 0.37 1984 
Azerbaijan 0  0 7.16 -4.41 1992 
Kazakhstan 0  0 16.35 -3.06 1990 
Turkmenistan 0  0 3.67 -4.97 1993 
Uzbekistan 0  0 20.51 -1.16 1991 
INDUST: Coastal         
Australia 1  1 17.07 2.13 . 
Belgium 1  1 9.97 2.75 . 
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INDUST: Coastal (cont’d)  
Canada 1  1 27.79 2.31 . 
Cyprus 1  1 0.68 4.40 . 
Denmark 1  1 5.14 2.15 . 
Finland 1  1 4.99 2.97 . 
France 1  1 56.74 2.61 . 
Greece 1  1 10.16 3.11 . 
Iceland 1  1 0.25 2.83 . 
Ireland 1  1 3.51 4.10 . 
Italy 1  1 56.72 2.88 . 
Japan 1  1 123.54 4.18 . 
Netherlands 1  1 14.95 2.41 . 
New Zealand  1  1 3.44 1.28 . 
N o r w a y  1   14 . 2 43 . 0 4 .  
Portugal 1  1 9.90 3.90 . 
Spain 1  1 38.84 3.34 . 
Sweden 1  1 8.56 2.17 . 
United Kingdom  1  1 57.56 2.12 . 
United States  1  1 249.44 2.21 . 
Germany 0  0 79.43 1.99 . 
INDUST: Landlocked         
Austria 1  1 7.73 2.85 . 
Luxembourg 1  1 0.38 3.20 . 
Switzerland 1  1 6.71 1.44 . 
INDUST: Resource-rich    
<no cases>     
Notes: 
†Ethiopia became landlocked in 1994 with the independence of Eritrea. 
*Growth rates are calculated for available years. In39 means at least 39 of 40 annual growth observations 
1961-2000 available. In35 means at least 35 of 40 annual growth observations 1961-2000 available. 
Most of our empirical work excludes the industrial countries and also excludes any country without at least 
39 observations.






SYNDROMES  Country (bold = 
case study country)  Soft 
controls 
Hard 









Angola 91-05  75-90  75-05  90-05  94-05  72-75  75-02  60-71 
Benin  60-74, 
04-05  75-89 --  --  --  --  --  90-03 
Botswana  -- --  --  --  --  --  --  60-05 
Burkina Faso  60-82 83-90  --  --  --  --  --  91-05 
Burundi  72-88 --  72-88 72-88  72-88  --  60-72,  
88-05  -- 
Cameroon  60-77 --  --  --  78-93  --  --  94-05 
Cape Verde  75-91  --  --  --  --  74-75  --  60-73,  
92-05 
C. A. R.  65-05  --  --  65-79  --  --  96-03  60-64 
Chad  60-05 --  60-90  --  --  --  79-84  -- 
Comoros 79-05  76-78  79-05  79-89  --  --  76-78,  
90-05  60-75 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  --  --  65-73  73-97  --  --  60-65,  
96-05  -- 











SYNDROMES  Country  
(bold = case study)  Soft 
controls 
Hard 









Cote d'Ivoire  80-89 --  --  70-90  --  --  --  60-69,  
91-00 
Djibouti --  --  77-05  --  --  --  91-00  60-76 
Equatorial Guinea  --  --  --  68-05  --  --  68-79  60-67 
Eritrea --  99-05  --  --  --  --  99-00  93-98 
Ethiopia  -- 74-91  --  --  --  --  --  60-73, 
92-05 
Gabon 60-97  --  --  --  --  --  --  98-05 
Gambia, The  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  60-05 
Ghana  72-78, 84  60-68,  
79-83  60-68 --  --  --  --  69-71, 
85-05 
Guinea  60-63,  
78-84  64-77 --  --  73-84  --  --  85-05 
Guinea-Bissau 74-05  --  --  --  --  60-73  98-05  -- 
Kenya  72-90 --  78-02, 
03-05  -- --  --  --  60-71 
Lesotho --  --  --  --  --  --  --  60-05 
 






SYNDROMES  Country  
(bold = case study)  Soft 
controls 
Hard 













Madagascar  72-75,  
86-96  76-85 --  --  --  72-77  02  60-71,  
97-01,03-05 
Malawi  -- --  --  --  --  --  --  60-05 
Mali  -- 60-68  --  68-91  --  --  --  92-05 
Mauritania 74-85  --  --  -- --  --  --  60-73, 
86-05 
Mauritius  60-70 --  --  --  --  --  --  71-05 
Mozambique  60-76 77-86  --  74-76  --  69-74  74-91  92-05 
Namibia  -- --  --  --  --  75-89  --  60-74, 
90-05 
Niger  60-89 --  --  --  74-89  --  90-99  00-05 
Nigeria  -- 83-86  67-03 73-87,  
93-98  70-87 --  66-70  60-65, 
04-05 
Rwanda --  --  73-94  --  --  --  93-94  60-72, 
95-05 
Sao Tome and 
Principe  NA NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
 






SYNDROMES  Country  
(bold = case study)  Soft 
controls 
Hard 









Senegal  60-93 --  --  --  74-78  --  --  94-05 
Seychelles 93-05  72-92  --  -- --  --  --  60-71 




South Africa  60-91  --  60-91  --  --  77-93  --  94-05 
Sudan  70-89 --  --  --  --  --  62-72, 
85-05  60-61 
Swaziland --  --  --  --  -- --  --  60-05 
Tanzania  86-94 70-85  --  --  --  --  --  60-69, 
95-05 
Togo  74-05 --  75-00 94-05  74-89  94-00  91-93  60-73 
Uganda  60-67, 
71-91  68-70 66-70  71-79  --  --  79-86  92-05 
Zambia  68-91 --  --  --  73-89  --  --  60-67, 
92-05 
Zimbabwe  65-99 00-05  --  98-05  --  76-80, 
91-97  76-80 60-64 
 
Source: Judgmental classification by project editors and country authors. NA denotes inadequate basis for classification.
  54Table A3. Neighbor effects on growth (continuation of text table 20).  
LAD regressions  Variable 
(7) (8) (9) 
Landlocked (LL)  -0.535***  -0.491**  -1.182*** 
  0.201 0.204 0.286 
Resource-rich (RR)  -0.597***  -0.601**  -0.716*** 
  0.217 0.256 0.195 
Island  1.465*** 1.481*** 1.350*** 
  0.089 0.231 0.174 
Neighbor  growth  0.319*** 0.321*** 0.280*** 
  0.036 0.042 0.032 
CO*SSA  -1.143*** -1.136*** -1.219*** 
  0.218 0.295 0.231 
LL*SSA -0.950***  -1.012**  -0.388 
  0.332 0.423 0.362 
RR*SSA  -0.204 -0.201 -0.179 
  0.289 0.219 0.283 
Island*SSA -1.122***  -1.084**  -0.964* 
 0.41  0.479  0.54 
Neighbor  growth*LL  -- -- 0.201*** 
    0.077 
Neighbor  growth*RR  -- -- 0.04 
    0.083 
Nbr growth*CO*SSA  --  -0.213***  -0.181** 
   0.075  0.072 
Nbr growth*LL*SSA  --  0.032  -0.123 
   0.073  0.092 
Nbr growth*RR*SSA  --  -0.282***  -0.279*** 
   0.079  0.099 
Neighbor growth*SSA  -0.186***  --  -- 
 0.067     
Dry  year  -0.09 -0.05 -0.099 
  0.134 0.148 0.101 
N  5620 5620 5620 
Pseudo-R2  0.0626 0.0639 0.0647 
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Bootstrapped standard errors. All regressions include a full set of year 
effects. 
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